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Abstract
Time memory trade-off (TMTO) is a computationally intensive cryptographic attack
originally introduced by Hellman in 1980. Since then many different improvements and
implementations were researched and developed. In this thesis, we propose a frame work to
implement TMTO with parallel computing using message passing interface (MPI) which
is generic to serve a general cryptographic algorithm with flexibility. We have presented
the framework development, design rationale, behavior testing, and proposal for collision
handling. For the design rationale, we identified all the components, and features needed
to build or expand the framework, and we identified the differences between it and original
methodology proposed by Hellman. We explained the rationale behind choosing specific
features for our implementation and for adding verification features like XOR cipher. We
tested the behavior of the framework using mostly Simeck and partially Speck ciphers. We
show that the main issue affecting the effectiveness of the generic implementation is colli-
sions. We concluded that problem is almost completely parallel and coarse grained once we
ignore the requirement for uniformly distributed random generation of the starting points.
Throughout the program design and job result analysis, it became apparent that collision
will be the main challenge so we proposed a fine grained collision detection and avoidance
algorithm using parallel computing that should eliminate this problem and increase the
coverage of the framework. The proposed algorithm relies on three layers of processes.
The difference from the current approach is the middle layer that will be responsible for
detecting and preventing collisions using doubly linked list structures. This will also be
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The world of information security can be illustrated by using contests or competition
analogy. There is the race to break into a system before it is patched, the race to patch
systems before they are compromised, the competition between contesting parties to find
a superior technology, the challenge to hide some information for a specific time and a
challenge to try to uncover it within that time. All parties try to use the best technology
they can acquire to build defensive and/or offensive scenarios. Better technology that can
be viewed as superior architecture, algorithms and computation capacity decides who wins.
The world of cryptography and cryptanalysis is a part of it. Cryptographers try to
develop cryptographic systems that help ensure the confidentiality of information (Encryp-
tion), and ensure the integrity of the data and the authenticity of the sender [1, p. 4-6].
Both cryptography and cryptanalysis count on intensive computation to establish and ver-
ify the security of cryptographic systems. For example, public key cryptography like RSA
uses intensive computation to transport the session keys (protecting session key transport),
while intruders and cryptanalysts may use brute force computation to try to break ciphers.
One of the technologies that are key to increasing the performance of algorithms is parallel
computing. With the resources available in today’s world, parallel computing is used to
increase the performance of cryptography algorithms as well as increase the performance of
cryptanalysis attacks. Damrudi et al.[2] discussed using parallel pipeline of tree topology
to increase the performance of TRSA, a public key, asymmetric algorithm. In symmetric
key cryptography Fiskiran et al.[3] used parallel computing to increase the table lookup
performance. Pramanik et al.[4] went further to explore DNA computing to achieve parallel
cryptography.
1
1.1 The motivation behind the work
The motive behind the work was to explore the potentials of parallel computing by devel-
oping a framework that uses the Scinet super computer General Purpose Cluster (GPC)
[5]. We intend to formalize a framework that is flexible enough to accommodate for any
ciphers and potentially many attacks later on. This means that we had to develop the
code ourselves. By doing so we can generate information that would help understand the
effect of such parallel computing power on the race between intruders and defenders.
1.2 Our contribution
The focus of this work is to identify the components of and create a framework that
utilizes a super computer MPI based technology to cater for multiple time-memory trade-
off (TMTO) attacks. To do this we considered as many approaches and ideas within the
TMTO domain as possible, and implemented some of them in an expandable framework
that can be upgraded to implement more ideas and ciphers. The framework can be a
base to test different approaches to the problem. It should also be able to compare attack
times for different algorithms provided the ciphers are comparable. We can enumerate the
contribution as the following:
• Framework development: We have developed a framework that is flexible enough
to accommodate different ciphers and added features for the TMTO attack under
MPI or message passing interface. The framework has an external part that controls
versions, job runs, probing (sensitivity analysis), and result analyses. And there is
the internal part which does the actual parallel computation. The internal part is
programmed using C language and is denoted TMTO-MPI.
• Design rationale: We have identified components needed to build and expand the
framework, and we have differentiated between our work and the original Hellman
[6] approach. We explained the rationale behind our design decisions and introduced
a stability verification technique using simple XOR block cipher.
• Testing: We ran tests and wrote observations about the behavior of the algorithm
under different parameters and used Simeck and Speck block ciphers as out test
instances. We observed and analyzed the behavior of output density, sorting, false
positives and collisions. We concluded that collisions are the biggest problem that
affects the effectiveness of this this approach.
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• Collision handling: We proposed a fine grained parallel architecture for solving one
of the most pressing issues, that is, the problem of collision detection and avoidance.
This proposed approach is based on 3 layers of processes. The first layer is made of
one parent process responsible for main operations like initializing variable, initiating
MPI, finishing MPI, and reporting. The second layer is made of multiple custodian
processes, each responsible for maintaining a doubly linked list to keep track of block
values that were calculated, and to reject new block values that were previously
calculated. And the third layer is made of the majority of processes and is responsible
for the actual cryptographic operations.
This work is more focused on following highlighted items illustrated in Table 1.1. Other
focus areas might also apply but at a much lesser weight than the highlighted primary focus
area.
Table 1.1: Research primary focus area by comparisons
with others
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work assumes we are trying
to recover a key, not forge
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There were some Speck runs
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(ISC)2 [7], this work obvi-














1.3 Organization of the thesis
Chapter 2 reviews the literature in the domain of Time-memory trade-off, and summarizes
the different approaches and ideas. It also provides a chronological account of progress
since the original methodology. Chapter 3 is more oriented towards the preliminaries and
the building blocks that need to be understood in order the design the attack framework.
Chapter 4 presents the workflow of TMTO with MPI and describes the program specifi-
cations and the rational behind it. Chapter 5 discusses the experimental runs and results.
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Chapters 6 provides conclusions and future work respectively. The appendix includes an





2.1 On time-memory trade-off (TMTO) attacks
Hellman [6] introduced the time-memory trade-off (TMTO) approach in 1980. The general
idea was trade-off the recurrent, normally unattainable, brute force or exhaustive search
cost that is required to crack a cipher with a one-time table pre-computation effort. Since
the storage requirements are also infeasible, Hellman was able to virtually order the lookup
tables into chains each having a cryptographic relation between its rings that enables the
implementor to compress the storage requirements into a fraction by only keeping the
starting point and end point of each chain, and applied the method to attack DES. Since
then many have worked to optimize this attack and extend it to other ciphers than DES.
Oechslin [8] proposed a solution for the colliding or merging chains, and defines a set of
reduction functions (function1, ..., functiont−1). This will make it possible for chains to
merge only if the collision happens at the same point t in the same table. This lead to
increased performance by 7 folds compared to the original method. Standaert et al.[9]
proposed improvement to the distinguished points based algorithm to decrease memory
access and an implementation using field-programmable gate array (FPGA). Stamp [10]
explains three models of time-memory trade-off (TMTO), the “population count”example,
the Shank algorithm and Hellman’s Cryptanalytic TMTO. The objective of TMTO is to
reach an optimum point between memory usage (already populated by pre-computation)
and calculation time to retrieve some result. Biryukov [11] extends the time-memory trade-
off to a time-memory-key trade-off where the same plaintext is available encrypted by
multiple keys. Hong et al.[12] proposed a variant of the distinguished points called variable
distinguished points (VDP) that affected the amount to table lookups. Avoine et al.[13]
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work focused on decreasing the overhead of the false alarms while searching for leads.
Narayanan et al.[14] proposed a password dictionary attack that performs better than
Oechslin’s rainbow table attack using time-space trade-off. Biryukov et al.[15] extended te
concept to Time/Memory/Key trade-off. Mentens et al.[16] were the first to implement a
hardware solution based on Oechslin’s rainbow table approach. Barkan et al.[17] formalized
a general time-memory trade-off model. Ma et al.[18] identified a gap between Hellman’s
lower bound and the actual success probability. Hong [19] analyzed the cost of false positive
and incorporated it into Hellman’s and Oechslin’s approaches.
2.2 Parallel computing approach
Karnin [20] introduced parallel computing into the mechanism and developed a time-
memory-processor relation. Later Amirazizi et al.[21] explored the possibilities of parallel
computing and it’s effect on the trade-off by estimating the capital cost, solution cost and
run cost. Chang et al.[22] proposed a new parallel algorithm for the knapsack problem that
would deliver solution for n component using O(2n/4) memory, O(2n/8) processors, with a
cost of O(25n/8) . Li et al.[23] proposed a new parallel algorithm to the knapsack problem.
Sykes et al.[24] used MPI to implement Oechslins [8] faster time-memory trade-off
attack on Windows hashes. They used SHARCNET which is the same organization that
provides GPC so it is very similar to our work in terms of the homogeneous nature of the
computing nodes. Their focus was to reduce the table computation time, the password
cracking time, and discussing the efficiency of the parallel approach. Their paper discussed
an overview of RainbowCrack, the probability of finding a match in N space in a given
table defined by t, and m, and the four categories of passwords:
• Alpha characters: Letters (A to Z). It was not clear why the lower case letters (a to
z) were not included as most password systems treat lower case letters as different
characters.
• Alpha-numeric characters: By adding the numbers’ characters from (0 to 9) to pre-
vious set.
• Alpha-numeric-symbol14: By adding 14 commonly use symbols in passwords ! @ #
$ %ˆ( ) − = + & ∗ to previous set.
• Alpha-numeric-symbol-all: By adding˜‘ [ ] { } | \ : ; ” ′ < > , . ? / to the previous
set. In this set space is not included but it is not common for space to be included
in allowed character list for passwords.
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Sykes et al.[24] investigated the RainbowCrack and decided that the two processes that
take the most time is the table generation and sorting. This is similar to what was observed
in our work. They also decided that the table generation computation can be completely
done in parallel. It is not clear though if there was any assurance that random starting
points do not overlap or are uniformly distributed. They defined four and worked on three
different technical approaches to saving the rainbow tables to disk:
• Each process generates and writes separate files using standard native file library.
• All process write to the same files using MPI file library.
• All process communicate data to the Master process which writes to the one file.
This one is the nearest to our approach.
As for sorting, Sykes et al.[24] broke the file into multiples and sorted each by itself
using quick sort which is the same algorithm RainbowCrack uses. Then there are two
other rounds using half the processors and the master processor to merge all files into one
sorted file. In our work, we sorted each table alone and left it there. There was no need to
combine all tables together. For searching [24] they tried two different approaches and the
one that proved beneficial is to send the hash value to all processors and divide the tables
amongst them and each would report its finding.
In his thesis Taber [25] used the same technique by Oechslins [8] to create rainbow
tables. While Al-Khazraji [4] developed Taber’s work to support more algorithms, sorting,
and different operating system’s passwords. The focus was still on hashing algorithms
(md4, md5, sha1, lm and ntlm). When the rainbow table is designed to break password
hashing the reduction function has to not only reduce the length of the key is as the case
with Hellman’s original work, but it needs to make sure the strings used apply to the world
of passwords. In other words using bytes that cannot be used in specific password hashing
algorithm should be avoided.
2.3 Implementations of different algorithms
Time-memory trade-off attack can be used to attack many ciphers. Fiat et al.[26] developed
a rigorous TMTO that would work for any function rather that just DES as in Hellman’s
original work. Saarinen [27] used to attack LILI-128. Bjorstad [28] would use TMTO
to attack the Grain cipher and Dinur [29] would use it to attack FX-construction based
ciphers. Biryukov et al.[30] used the TMTO against stream ciphers. Mentens et al.[16]
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implemented a Unix password cracker. Dunkelman et al.[31] implemented TMO on stream
ciphers using the initialization vectors.
2.4 Attributes for measurement
Using time-memory trade-off attack to crack passwords was thoroughly discussed in [32]
“A novel time-memory trade-off method for password recovery”. It is concerned with
using a new time-memory trade-off technique to crack password using rainbow tables. The
research [32] approached the subject from the perspective of the forensic analyst, and
compared against baseline of well known rainbow table methods and uses the following as
criteria:
• Reduction in storage.
• Success rate.
• Collisions.
It reviews different tools available in the market that use time-memory trade-off concept
introduced by [6] and optimized by [8] to attack passwords. This paper [32] first discusses
how Hellman’s [6] concept would apply to cracking password hashes, and it explains how
the use of the reduction function might increase the collisions and decrease rate of suc-
cessful recovery. The paper argues that increasing the number of tables, with different
reduction function in each, would increase the success ratio while increasing the compu-
tational complexity and storage requirements. The paper [32] also reviews the concept of
distinguished end points by [33] as a way to avoid loops and it’s limitation and false alarms
rate increase leading to a computation penalty. The new design proposed by [32] differs
from the rainbow table method in that it stores the initial value with multiple outputs
instead of just one.
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2.5 Historical progress
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To summarize, we can see that since Hellman’s original proposal the Time-Memory trade-
off development over the last 38 years went in different direction:
• Advancements in the algorithm to increase coverage, for example by developing the
tables.
• Advancements in the algorithm to increase response time, for example by enhancing
sorting.
• Advancements in the algorithm to decrease false positives, for example by collision
avoidance using distinguished points.
• Supporting different types of cryptographic families like block ciphers, stream ciphers
and hashing.
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• Supporting different ciphers.





As described in [33] Brute force (exhaustive search) and precomputed table lookup are
two simple ways of attacking ciphers. The time-memory trade-off is a combination of the
two approaches. Borst et al.[34] also presents exhaustive search and table pre-computation
as two ends of a spectrum and focuses on minimizing memory access while applying the
TMTO. Hong et al.[37] reinterpret TMTO as a way to invert one way functions. They
discuss different approaches for TMTO and develop an unified view of it.
3.1.1 Brute force and dictionary attacks
In the world of communication and computer security, brute force or exhaustive search
means that the attacker will try all possible permutation of a solution to find the one that
solves the problem. For example, if the attackers wants to find a 16 bits key that was use
to encrypt a message, they would try 216 or 65536 possible permutation to decrypt the
ciphertext and then apply some extra logic to filter for valid answers. Another example
in the case of on-line password cracking, where the attackers would try all permutation
of permitted characters in an authentication system and try to login to that system. If
the login succeeds then that was the right password. The permitted characters could be
upper case alphabet, lower case alphabet, numbers, special character or a combination of
two or more of these sets. Smarter attacks would take into consideration characters that
are not allowed to be used in a specific system as it will significantly decrease the time
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complexity. Brute force attack will always succeed with enough time and computing power
to finish all permutations. This is not always available for the attacker. On the other end
of this spectrum are smarter, lower complexity but not guaranteed to succeed attacks like
dictionary attacks which depend on trying variations of highly probably passwords rather
than trying all permutations. A third example would be the off-line password attack where
it is given that the attackers were able to obtain a list of the hashed passwords. The brute
force or dictionary attacks in this scenario would be to try the different password and
verify if the match the hash for a specific account. When time-memory trade-off attacks
are applied to password systems, special care must be taken to convert the ciphertext
outputted by an encryption operation into usable string as demonstrated by Taber’s [25]
demo cipher system.
3.1.2 Pre-computed tables
In a known plaintext attack where the plaintext is PT , if the attackers have two column
array of keys and ciphertexts pairs that result from encrypting the same plaintext PT
with all possible keys, then finding the key is just a lookup problem. If the array is sorted
based on the ciphertext, then the lookup operation complexity is very small. In reality,
the storage requirement is not attainable.
3.1.3 The super case of brute force and pre-computed tables
In 1980 [6] introduced the concept of time-memory trade-off. This attack demonstrated
that the attacker can keep T number of different key results in one entry by reusing the
output ciphertext as a key to re-encrypt the known plaintext again. This meant that there
exists a cryptographic relation between all the intermediate states of this chain. Hellman’s
algorithm [6] is as follows:
• Table pre-computation:
– An array of M words is randomly generated to be uniformly distributed in the
space of possible key values. This has the complexity of O(M) and is saved in
memory as M elements representing starting points.
– Each one of those array elements is encrypted and reduced T times. The result
is also saved in memory representing end point. This has the complexity of
O(M ∗T ) which is equivalent to O(N) since N = T ∗M for cipher of key values
N .
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– Sorting: array is sorted based on end points to reduce the complexity of the
search. This would vary according to the used sorting algorithm but it could
have a worst case O(N2).
• Searching has a complexity of O(N (2/3)): All end points are searched for the cipher-
text but the complexity can be ignored due to the sorting done in previous step. If a
match is found we calculate the key by starting at the starting point and regenerate
the chain up to T -1. If there is no match, the ciphertext is used to encrypt the
plaintext and the array is searched again. If a match is found this time then the
chain is recalculated up to t-2 this time and so on. This will have the complexity of
O(t ∗m) which is different from O(T ∗M) or O(N) because there is no significant
gain from increasing m or t beyond mt2 = N .
3.2 Simeck
Simeck was introduced in [38] and it is a lightweight block cipher family that is designed
based on SIMON and SPECK. The authors [38] compare the performance of the the three
ciphers and give the specification of the cipher focusing on the hardware implementation.
Since applying the time-memory trade-off attack using Message Passing Interface (MPI)[39]
on General Purpose Cluster (GPC)[5] requires software implementation of the protocol,
we will use the code available at [40] as foundation to create the attack. Simeck specific
cipher are written in the form Simeck2n/mn where n is the word size in bits which makes
the block size 2n, and m is how many words make the key[38]. The available versions
of Simeck (Simeck32/64, Simeck48/96, Simeck64/128) have the key size equal double the
block size. The large key size is used to facilitate the key scheduling functionality of the
cipher. While each of the encryption rounds uses only one word of the key, the key rotation
function rotates the key works so all of them get used [40]. In our demonstration of this
attack we will use m=2 to make the key size the same as the block size. Simeck Depends
on a round function:
Rki(li, ri) = (ri ⊕ f(li)⊕ ki, li),
f(x) = (x (x≪ 5))⊕ (x≪ 1)
where “≪ ”represents the left rotation operation. The round function is used for both
the encryption, and the key scheduling. It take two words of size n (2n) and copies the left
most significant word li into the right least significant word ri. Cyclic shift to the left by
5 is applied to li and then bitwise-ANDed to the original li. This is again XORed to the
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original li that has been cyclically shifted by 1 to the left. The result is XORed with the
key word ki and XOR’d again with ri If we expand the R function:
ri+1 = li,
li+1 = ri ⊕ ((li  (li≪ 5))⊕ (li≪ 1))⊕ ki.
Using the same logic to revert the round function R and create Reverse Round R−1:
li−1 = ri,
ri−1 = li ⊕ ((ri  (ri≫ 5))⊕ (ri≫ 1))⊕ ki−1.
Simeck is a Feistel cipher structured on a nonlinear feedback shift register (NLFSR) with
input similar to DES [38]. Key scheduling uses the same primitives to create the keys for
each round.
3.3 Speck
Simon and Speck ciphers, according to Beaulieu et al.[41] were designed to be generalist
block cipher that can adapt with the changing and unforeseen requirements of the world
of IoT. Though other solution exists that are simple or small Simon and Speck aim is to
provide a simple and small security solution. The researchers discuss some of these solution
and how AES implementations fail to meet those two criteria together. Speck is very
similar to Simeck as Simeck was based on the same design ideas as Speck and Simon. The
same operation are used: Bitwise AND, bitwise XOR, modular addition and subtraction,
left and right circular shifts. The main two functions are the key scheduling and the
encrypt/decrypt. This family of ciphers is designed to cater to different requirements
depending on the system constrains and it was scrutinized by the cryptographic community
[41]. In our comparisons we will use the implementation provided by [42].
3.4 Parallel computing and MPI
Parallel computing enables a computer program to be split into multiple jobs each running
on a different processor. While there are many was to achieve parallel computing this
work uses Message Passing Interface (MPI) on the General Purpose Cluster (GPC) super
computer [5] provided by Canada Compute’s Scinet and hosted at the university of Toronto.
GPC has 30240 cores organized into nodes of 8 cores with 16GB of memory per node [5].
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Submitting jobs is limited to 48 hours of walltime for 32 cores. More cores means booking
smaller walltime. Figure 3.1 shows the default total computing power allowed to submit
on GPC. The numbers were calculated based on information in [5]. An important thing to
take into consideration is that booking books whole nodes.
Figure 3.1: Default total computing power allowed to submit on GPC
Figure 3.1 plots nodes and walltime on the left axis and plots cores and total node-
hour on the right axis. The total node-hours is fixed while cores decrease as the walltime
increases. Nodes and cores are reflections of each others as 1 node is made of 8 cores.
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Chapter 4
Program Specification, Rationale and
Design for TMTO in MPI
In this chapter we present our design decisions and the rationale behind them for the
proposed algorithm of implementing TMTO in MPI. We use mostly Simeck, and in some
jobs Speck, as instances to test the algorithm. We will first describe some of the key
concepts, important variables, overall algorithms, framework structure, each phase details,
and then we propose a fine-grained parallel algorithm version that is enforced with collision
detection and prevention to increase the effectiveness of the algorithm, as well as gather
more information about the bias of ciphers.
4.1 Key concepts
4.1.1 Reduction function
Reduction function was introduced by the first time-memory trade-off research [6] to reduce
the size of the output ciphertext of a preceding encryption operation tn. In his thesis
Taber [25] defines the purpose of a reduction function as a way to map the ciphertext into
plaintext. Since DES has a key size of 56 bits that is smaller than the 64 bits plaintext
and ciphertext block sizes, it made sense to reduce the ciphertext by 8 bits so it can be
directly reused as the key for the next encryption operation tn+1. In the case of Simeck
[38] and Speck [41] there might not be an urging need to do so since the key size is larger
than the ciphertext and plaintext block sizes. A reduction function is still important to
test scenarios where it is needed to:
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• Decrease the record size to achieve larger tables with the same available storage.
• Just decrease the overall table size.
• Increase the rate possible match finding (leads).
And in all these cases the number of leads will increase and there will be more calculations
to retrieve the key because the number of false leads will increase. In this work the key
is already reduced since we use a modified version of the algorithms that accepts half the
key size as input and duplicates it to create the internal input for the key scheduler.
4.1.2 Reduction in storage
Storage is also a key player in an actual attack scenario where tables have to be stored and
retrieved. Since this work is experimental and measures many individual runs, storage was
not a concern.
4.1.3 Success rate
The success rate measures how many times the search for key is successful. By using
different keys to challenge the attack one ends up with multiple scenarios. Sometimes, the
tables do not cover a specific key. Other times, there could be multiple successful matches.
4.1.4 Collisions
In the context of TMTO, collision refers to the fact that encrypting plaintext PT with
some key K1 could lead to ciphertext CT1 and that CT1 could exist somewhere else in
the tables. Since almost all ciphertexts get reused as keys after reduction, this means that
the nodes in the two chains will be of the same value. The more collisions the more wasted
storage and calculations. Ciphertext CT1 could exist in more than one node as a result of
two encryption operations, or redundancy in generating the pseudorandom starting points,
or a mix of both.
4.1.5 Distinguished points
Distinguished points we introduced by Rivest [33] to decrease the possibility of collisions.
This is done by defining a set of patterns that -if reached- the chain would stop growing.
21
Figure 4.1: The use of main variables in the TMTO-MPI algorithm
4.1.6 Start point-end point pairs
Every chain has a randomly generated Starting point, and an end point. In this work
we use LFSR to generate the starting points. We reach the end point after applying the
encryption operation T times to the starting point by using the output ciphertext CT to
encrypt the plaintext P over and over again. We only save the initial starting point and
the resulting end point as if we virtually save the whole chain since the relation between
starting point and end point is deterministic and reproducible.
4.2 Important variables
Choosing the variables or parameters for time-memory trade-off implementation was ini-
tially based on guided trial and error. This is due to the fact that initially most of the
effort was to test the framework. There are some approximate bounds discussed by Saraan
et al.[43] as they worked to define Hellman’s table coverage in terms of number of distinct
points. In this work we will define the important key variables in the following subsections.
Figure 4.1 shows the use of the main variables within the TMTO algorithm.
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4.2.1 Iterations (T )
T is the variable representing time in the time-memory trade-off. In the actual software
implementation it represents the fixed number of iterations in each chain. Each starting
point is used as a cryptographic key and is then used to encrypt the plaintext T times. In
this research T is fixed which means that collisions cannot be avoided. The variable t refers
to the current iteration the program is at while generating the chains or while searching
the chains.
4.2.2 Memory (M) and (TotalM)
In the time-memory trade-off M is the number of memory records in the table. Each
record is a structure of two words each has the same size of the block cipher’s size. In this
parallel implementation, there are multiple cores, and each core has it’s own memory. All
those M values summed together - or multiply M by (C − 1) - gives TotalM which is the
total number of memory records. Since they are guaranteed to be unique , the TotalM
value is important in determining coverage. The variable m refers to the current record or
chain the program is working on.
4.2.3 Number of cores (C)
The number of used cores to run the test is determined by C. One core is kept to do
management work, like determining quotas and reporting while the others (C − 1) will do
the encryption, decryption, sort, search, and validation processes. Since core in the GPC
infrastructure is organized in 8 cores per node structure, one can only book multiples of 8.
The variable c refers to the current core that is executing some code. The c = 0 refers to
the master process running on the first core.
4.2.4 Type of encryption (E)
E is the type of cipher (Encryption) being attacked. The framework supports four ciphers
so far. Simeck and Speck were supported to be able to do some comparisons between two
similar ciphers. DES was initially supported in the discovery phase of the project. Though
XOR is basically a stream cipher, a simple block XOR cipher implementation was added
to be used for software stability and robustness verification.
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4.2.5 Indicating size difference (H)
To accommodate for ciphers that have different key-size from block-size H was introduced
to indicate the difference. It was originally used for the DES cipher attack that used a
reduction function. Reduction function reduces the larger block size to a smaller key size.
Since with Speck and Simeck the key-size is actually larger than the block size a reduction
function wasn’t used and H does not indicate anything.
4.2.6 Block size (B)
Block size is defined by B. In the case of DES it is 64 bits. In Simeck and Speck it is 48
bits. In the case of XOR cipher it is very relevant because the framework can test different
block sizes like 16, and 32.
4.2.7 Sorting (S)
Sorting records S based on the value of the end-point is essential to the success of time-
memory trade-off. The sorting guarantees that we can retrieve the matching record very
quickly using binary search. Sorting algorithms are very expensive and are assumed to be
onetime cost when building the precomputed tables. However, in a test environment where
we constantly try different scenarios we need to have a toggle to stop the sorting code to
get faster results.
4.2.8 Notes (N)
N is the notes section that describes every run. This information can be inserted manually
or can be generated by another script that tests multiple permutations.
4.2.9 Key, plaintext (PT ), ciphertext (CT ), challenge key (CK)
Plaintext is referred to as PT and it is fixed. Key is the the key that is used to encrypt the
PT . The first key for each chain is the SP of that chain. The output of the cryptographic
function is the ciphertext CT and it is used as the key to encrypt PT to generate the next
node in the chain. The CK refers to the Challenge Key that is use to generate the CT
that we are searching for.
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4.2.10 Starting points (SP ) and end points (EP )
Starting points array SP and End point array EP are the main data structure in this
framework. They hold the starting point of the chains and the final results after encrypting
PT T times. Originally it was one array each but because the TMTO problem is very
parallel the design changed to have as many arrays for SP and EP as we have core except
for the master core processor totaling C − 1 arrays each.
4.3 Algorithm: TMTO in MPI
The algorithm consists of the table generation, search and verification, shortened as TMTO-
MPI algorithm:
• Master table creation: First, there is a non parallel work done by the master process:
– Divide the TotalM over the number of cores that will be used for table genera-
tion and searching (C − 1). Complexity can be ignored.
– Create M starting points using LFSR Mc=0,t=0,m=1,Mc=0,t=0,m=2, ....,Mc=0,t=0,m=TotalM .
This code has complexity of O(TotalM).
– Only keep the first LFSR value for each core Mc=1,t=0,m=0,Mc=2,t=0,m=0, ....,Mc=C,t=0,m=0
and pass them to the respective cores. This code has complexity of O(C − 1).
• Parallel core search: Second, different cores pick up their tasks and start working on
them:
– Generate all starting points using LFSR and save them in SP array. This code
has complexity of O(M).
– Generate all chains for all records in the table. This code has complexity of
O(T ).
– Sort using bubble sort is optional but not often used to speed up the process.
This code has complexity of O(M2).
– Search for key. This code has complexity of O(M ∗T ) because currently sorting
is not enabled. This could be improved by using binary search after sorting and
the M part of complexity can be ignored leading to a complexity of O(T ).
– Verification by regenerating they key which has complexity of O(T ).
• Report to parent process: Third, all child cores processes report back to the parent
process. This code has complexity of O(C − 1) .
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Figure 4.2: External work-flow of TMTO-MPI algorithm
4.4 Framework structure of the TMTO-MPI algorithm
The work-flow of this algorithm includes two aspects. The first is external work-flow which
everything that happens before the actual object file start running on the GPC nodes,
and everything that happens after the object file stops running. This includes defining
the scope of the runs and all the main variables, preparing for the runs, submitting them
to the queue, and afterwards collecting and analyzing the results of the runs. Figure 4.2
illustrates the external work-flow. The external framework is constructed of shell code and
the researcher used some of the knowledge in [44],[45],[46],[47],[48] to solve some of the
technical issues involved in writing these scripts.
The second aspect is the internal work-flow of the object file or the binary that runs on
the GPC nodes after being queued by the external work-flow. It is the part that implements
the TMTO-MPI algorithm. The work-flow that was used can be summarized as follows:
• Master: Create tables and initializes them.
• Master: Dispatch to child processes.
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• Child: Calculate end points.
• Child: Sort records if required.
• Child: Search for the challenge CK.
• Child: Recursively re-encrypt and search.
• Child: Report back winner.
• Master: Receive and Finalize.
The main differences between this approach and the one proposed by [4] - other than
the obvious different algorithms- are that the master job distribute tasks to the children
do only the table calculations. It is implied that the sorting is done out of parallelization
using different mechanism as well as the search later on. In our work we do include the
sorting in the parallel computing by making all the children processes sort the tables
they have. Since sorting is very time consuming it is disabled in most runs because the
runs will search once and discard the generated tables. Figure 4.3 shows the internal
structure of the program. The program is written in C and the knowledge in the following
[49],[50],[51],[52],[53],[54],[55],[56],[57],[58],[59],[60],[61],[62],[63],[64],[65],[66] was consulted
to solve some of the technical issue faced during the writing.
4.5 Multi-phases in the TMTO-MPI algorithm
4.5.1 Initialization
After the framework has spawned and submitted a job to the super computer, the job gets
queued and then eventually started. The programs execution goes as follows:
• Defining global and other variables like M , TotalM , T , and C. Arrays need to be
dynamically defined in the heap as it is unlimited in size if compared with the stack.
• Test the random key encryption and decryption using the requested cipher in the all
processes. It outputs the test results like this for a plaintext of “DwAAgh ”:
[MAIN]==Random key: [0_7a_z][1_33_3][2_62_b][3_54_T][4_73_s][5_6a_j]
==CT Challenge: [0_49_I][1_5a_Z][2_26_&][3_81_~A][4_4b_K][5_9f_~_]
== CT decrypts back to: [0_44_D][1_77_w][2_41_A][3_41_A][4_67_g][5_68_h].
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Figure 4.3: Internal structure of the program: initialization, distribution, calculation,
sorting and searching in TMTO-MPI algorithm
Each byte is printed as index, numeralformat, character− format. This is printed
by all cores as it does not impose in added complexity to do so as compared to the
overhead of calculating once and communicating (C − 1) times.
• Message Passing Interface (MPI) gets initialized at this point. Before that, each
process is not aware if it is a parent or child process. Once MPI is initialized the
processes communicate together and each one assumes its role as Parent or child.
• Variables that are associated with each process are defined at this point, Most im-
portantly the starting and end point arrays of the chains in each of the processes.
• The Parent process initializes values using LFSR to be starting points for the first
chain in each table. It then communicates these starting points to individual child
processes.
• Each child process takes those Starting point values and use LFSR to generate all
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the starting points for the tables.
Figure 4.4 shows some of the alternative features that the framework could be expanded
to include.
Figure 4.4: Initialization, calculation, sorting, and searching in TMTO-MPI algorithm can
be expanded to have more than one implementation
4.5.2 Randomization
Random functions in C
Initial test results using the random C function were not very successful. Even with
different seeds there was significant overlap between the generated strings in different cores.
Monitoring the randomness as the tables get bigger is problematic to say the least. We
decided to go with LFSR as it will hardly overlap and is uniformly distributed.
Uniformly distributed LFSR
In this work we use linear feedback shift register (LFSR) to populate the starting points
which generates a set of M records that are uniformly distributed. LFSR sequence will
have a period of 2n− 1 [67]. The problem with this approach is that it limits the ability of
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the program to run in parallel. Haromoto et al.[68] proposed an algorithm that would help
in making the starting point generation based on LFSR more parallel. Using a fast jump-
ahead algorithm they can achieve better results than sliding windows method. LFSR code
is based on the C language code in [69],[70]. Katz et al.illustrates that a cipher is perfectly
indistinguishable from a uniform random distribution of the attacker fails to identify it by
a probability highest that 50%. Thus the need of randomization is not important since
encryption algorithms output should not be distinguishable from uniformly distributed
values.
LFSR caching
Another way to increase the speed of LFSR generation is to generate the values once for
the maximum number of cores anticipated once. This can be saved to file and loaded
later instead of regeneration. This was not implemented but it could be as part of general
pre-emption strategy that would allow the program to stop and pick up where it left.
Using the memory location itself as SP
Instead of generating random numbers for the starting point the program can start with
a sequence of numbers which has one to one mapping with the memory locations they
are stored in. This can increase the storage capacity to be almost double. The drawback
is that it can not be sorted after generating the tables as it will lose the relation to the
memory address. This can only be used for attacks with tables that are freshly generated
every time.
The need for randomization and or uniform distribution
The researcher believes that setting the starting points using random techniques to be
uniformly distributed -as proposed by Hellman’s [6] original trade-off - might not be needed
as the encryption algorithms should provide this feature organically. All that is needed is
for the starting points to be unique to minimize collisions, and that could be easily achieved
by a counter or partially copying memory addresses. This should have a significant effect on
the performance since the attack will be completely parallel and there will be no chocking
point at the beginning. Sykes et al.[24] claimed that the attack can be completely parallel
which can be consistent with this idea.
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4.5.3 Distributing the load
Quota calculation
While Taber [25] focuses on heterogeneous environment where nodes have different memory
processor and co processor speeds, that is not the case in this research. Our works is based
on GPC cluster that use homogeneous environment. The quota is the same for all cores
except the parent core that is dedicated to the first phase of initialization and distributing
the load. We decided to go with Coarse-grained parallelism since the solution fits nicely in
this manner. To detect false alarms and different leads while trying the initial development
of the program we forced the search loops to go all the way to the end, hence all cores
should finish in almost the same time.
Send and receive
MPI library takes care of the complex underlying communication system between the
nodes. MPI Send() sends messages to specific jobs running on other cores identified as
ranks. MPI Recv() receives those messages. In this work, after initialization first phase
the Parent process sends the LFSR results to all the Child processes utilizing a loop that
addresses the specific process ID (rank). After each child process is done with second
phase of initialization, calculation, sorting (if required),
MPI’s vector variable
Using MPI standard library we created a different data structure to make sure it is flexible
enough to transmit whatever block size required since the framework should work for
different types of cryptographic algorithms with different block sizes. The following code
define an MPI new data type using MPI Type vector to create a vector of BlockSizeBytes
bytes (MPI UNSIGNED CHAR).
MPI_Type_vector (BlockSizeBytes, 1, 1, MPI_UNSIGNED_CHAR, &BlockSize32);
The initial design attempted to create the tables using the Parent process and pass those
tables to child processes but this eventually lead to a limitation in memory as it was shared
between all processes. Since in this parallel model there is no need for each process to access
another process’s table we decided to separate the tables completely and only pass the first
starting point of the table.
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4.5.4 End point calculation
The child processes then start working by completing the initialization. This happens
by taking the string that was sent by the parent as the first staring point in the child
process table, and using it to generate all the starting points of the table via the same
LFSR. At the end of this phase each child process will have an array of strings that has
all the starting points. The child process will then proceed to generate the end point for
each of the starting point by doing the cryptographic operation and then the reduction
function. In this work, even though the reduction function was implemented for earlier
implementations for DES it was not used in this scenario since the key size is typically
larger than the ciphertext size. On the contrary, the cryptographic operations was changed
to take the ciphertext and double it to confirm with the key size.
4.5.5 Sorting
The sorting function was implemented but since the computational complexity of sorting
is high O(n2) and it has no real value in the iterative development approach that was
followed. We decided to submit most runs without sorting enabled and measure the effect
of sorting on some specific runs. It is worth mentioning that using string comparison -
and all string operations- in cryptographic scenarios needs some extra consideration as in
C/C++ a string ends with a Null which is not the case in our cryptographic blocks. Two
issues might arise: going out of block size boundary while trying to find the null at the end
of the string; or matching an early null that was produced by a cryptographic function.
4.5.6 Search
After all the tables are built each child process will search for the expected Ciphertext
challenge in the end points. If not found the cryptographic function will be applied to it
and search again. This will go for T times (from t = T till t = 0) to find all matches and
leads. Once a lead is found, the chain is regenerated to the point just before the match




All child processes report back to the parent process. All times and cryptographic function
outputs are kept in an output file generate by GPC. Each job generates three files: output
file, error file, and joblog file. Those files have the results of all processes that were involved
in the job. The output file has the output messages created by the program which uses
the code in [71] to display the binary representation of number if needed.
4.6 Comparisons with Hellman’s original approach
In the following, we highlight the differences between our TMTO-PMI algorithm and the
original work by Hellman [6]:
• We used LFSR generated sequences to populate the starting points instead of PRNG
to decrease the possibility of overlap.
• No specific reduction function as the key size is larger than the block size.
• While the original Hellman work was linear, this work is almost completely parallel.
• Our work is software based instead of hardware based.
• It is easier to adapted the software to different algorithms since the framework is
basically the same and we just need to add the algorithm and match it with a
reduction function if needed.
• Our framework does not need permanent storage. This potentially increases the time
(LFSR computation as opposed to file(s) read). However, it makes it very flexible in
terms of changing plaintext PT, key challenge KC, and ciphertext CT.
• The program does not exit right away on a verified match. It waits for other possible
solutions from other cores.
4.7 Design rationale for fine-grained parallel algorithm
To decrease collision, instead of calculating chains while iterating variable t until a distin-
guished point is reached, or having different reduction functions, one can prepare a doubly
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linked list with nodes each representing the start and end point of a range. Each node
will have a from, to fields representing the beginning and end of range that was already
calculated. It will also have two pointers fields essential to a doubly linked list structure.
There can be more than one linked list each managed by a different process (running on
a specific core) we call custodian. Every time a new ciphertext is generated, it is cross
checked with the linked list. Figure 4.5 shows the proposed process setup for managing
the doubly linked lists. The following results are expected when a child process reports a
new value to the linked list custodian:
Figure 4.5: Proposed process setup for managing the doubly linked lists in TMTO-MPI
algorithm
• If the new ciphertext belongs to one of the existing ranges, then it is not needed as
we’ve reached a chain overlap. The program should discard the result, set t = t− 1
and end the chain at the previous cipher test as any further encryption is redundant.
• If the new ciphertext is adjacent to an existing range in the linked list, that linked
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list is updated by decreasing the from value by one or increasing the to value by
one.
• After a node expands its range in one direction, it is checked with the node just
before it and if the touch - become adjacent- they are merged by changing the upper
limit of the lower node and discarding the higher node, or by changing the lower
limit of the higher node and discarding the lower node. Linked list pointers must be
updated accordingly.
• If the new ciphertext is neither part of or adjacent to an existing range, new node is
added to the linked list with both the from and to values set to the new ciphertext.
• This technique assumes that all reduction function are the same and will take place
after reduction. In this case the linked list must only span the reduced range. Alter-
natively, if this technique is implemented before the reduction function is applied or
if no reduction is applied then the linked list will span the full range of values that
can bre presented by the block size.
• The results will differ for different encryption, hashing and reduction algorithms but
it is reasonable to expect that the number of nodes in the linked list will decrease or
plateau after some time as permutation covered between m and t will start to come
closer. This is due to the two mechanisms working to pull in different directions.
One mechanism is increasing the number of nodes and another is combining adjacent
nodes without increasing the size and possibly decreasing it.
• Starting with starting points’ array (SP) that are a sequence of numbers will greatly
increase the performance of this technique as we will start with one node in the linked
list. If the results are distinguishable from uniformly distributed values it could be
an indication of bias in the cipher.
• Another added value for this technique is to measure request traffic on all custodian
nodes. If some nodes experience more traffic than others it could indicate a bias in
the cipher. Each custodian should keep 4 counter:
– How many requests were rejected?
– How many requests caused the creation of a new node?
– How many requests caused 2 nodes to merge?
– How many requests caused 1 node to expand its range?
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• Having this information for each node and comparing totals and rates for different
custodian can reveal a lot about the behavior of a cipher.
• Moving to this fine-grained parallel algorithm as opposed to the current coarse-
grained parallel algorithm will increase the overhead and change the complexity.
However, it will decrease the collision and add valuable information.
• To make the proposal more efficient we discard the randomization of the starting
points.
Figure 4.6 shows the proposed collision detection mechanism using linked list in TMTO-
MPI algorithm.
Figure 4.6: Proposed technique for collision detection using MPI base parallel computing
and linked list structures
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Chapter 5
Analysis of Runs and Results
After receiving the results for the job runs -that will be referred to as jobs throwout this
chapter- we tried different approaches to analyze the data. First approach was to extract
as much information as possible about every run and present that in spread sheet and
try to find relations. The second approach was to tackle individual arbitrary runs and do
thorough analysis to find out what happened and note observations. The third approach
evolved while working on the second and it focused on clustering similar runs in terms of
M , T , and C but with different W and keys. The choice of variables made sense as the
results should be very similar with one exception; it could be interrupted if the walltime
was not enough. We call this approach (walltime range) clustering approach. The following
sections will start with a description of the job evaluation card, then the individual run
analysis. And as we realize the walltime range cluster that it belongs to, the cluster will be
included to proof the similarity of the results. Finally it will draw some relations from the
overall statistics. The analysis script extracted over 1300 job results from the data saved
by these jobs. After some manual filtration we had 1270 jobs, 384 out of which completely
finished and found the verified the key.
5.1 Sample job evaluation card
Every job or cluster of jobs are described by an evaluation card. The card will contain
information about timing, file names, key, plaintext, block size, cipher type, walltime, etc..
The card is usually followed by observations about that job run and its results. The full
analysis including the evaluation cards in kept in appendix A. An example of such evalu-
37
ation card is shown below.
Job ID 45697538
The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
The job was finished in 0:35:29 minutes but did not find the Key.
Plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: [0_53_S][1_39_9][2_46_F][3_4e_N][4_71_q][5_72_r] and it is
used as the start point of the first chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1024) the chain end point becomes
: ___[0c]___[12]___[9b]___[41]___[f0]___[6f]
CipherText Challenge: [0_cc_][1_83_~C][2_e1_][3_14_^T][4_4f_O][5_8d_~M]
CT decrypts back to: [0_50_P][1_54_T][2_50_P][3_54_T][4_50_P][5_54_T]
output log: tmto1024t1024c2145386496m2hrs_bestCvrg0.o45697538
Output size (printf overhead): 43101 lines, 3321620 characters.
error log: tmto1024t10.....tCvrg0.e45697538 and it was empty.
Job log: tmt_Fri_Oct_20_..........7538.gpc-sched-ib0.joblog
source code file: tmt_Fri_Oct_20_.........tCvrg0.c






M=2145386496 (Note: Total number of records is 2145386496)
C=1024 (Note: 1024 core were used)
W=2:00:00 (Note: Two hours of walltime were booked)
T=1024 (Note: T is 1024)
B=48 (Note: Block size is 48)
E=2 (Note: Cipher is Simeck)
H=0 (Note: Key size and test block size are the same)
L=0 (Note: Initialization was done using LFSR)
S=1 (Note: No sorting)
R=GPC (Note: This means it was running GPC nodes, not on Development
node and not in debug mode)
notes=tmto1024t1024c2145386496m2hrs_bestCvrg0.out (Note: This is an
automated comment generated by a script)
Observations: There was and issue with ........
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5.2 Individual job and walltime range cluster analysis
In this section we look at some jobs and record observations. We take a look at some
successful runs as well as failed runs. We approach individual jobs as well as clusters of
similar jobs. We show that some jobs fail due to limited resources while other fail due
to bugs. We show from the successful results that that coverage rates support that the
algorithm is scalable.
5.2.1 Comparing search coverage rates - 3 billion records TotalM
Job 45697540 observation: Key was retrieved in around 53 minutes. This is the worst sce-
nario key retrieval time for this set of key environment variables. Jobs 45697540, 45697541,
45697543, 45697545, 45697546, 45697547, 45697548, and 45697549 have also exhibited very
similar behavior using different keys. Applying the same (walltime range) clustering ap-
proach we can assume the same behavior would manifest in the following jobs (45697581-
45697590, 45697500-45697509, and 45697621-45697630) at a totalM of 3,218,079,744 and
T of 1024, after dividing TotalM over 1023 child cores for 3,145,728 records per core, we
get a finish time of about 53 minutes which means that all runs with 1, 2, 3, or 4 requested
walltime will succeed. The average number of blocks that this algorithm can cover per
second is 1,029,876,100 based on the actual walltime that was used after removing two
outliers. CoveragePerSecondBasedOn is denoted CPSBO.
Figure 5.1 plots this relation. Total coverage is calculated by:
MaximumCoverage = T ∗ TotalM
CPSBOcput = MaximumCoverage/cput
CPSBOUsedWalltime = MaximumCoverage/(UsedWalltime ∗ C)





5.2.2 Comparing job coverage rates - 1 billion record TotalM
Jobs (45697601-45697610, 45697561-45697570, 45697520-45697529, 45697648-45697657, and
45697479-45697488) observations: 1072693248 TotalM with 1023 cores means 1048576 per
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Figure 5.1: The average number of blocks that this algorithm can cover per second is
1,029,876,100
core. All these jobs were successful in a little over 18 minutes. This is consistent with be-
havior with the “3 million records per core”set. Figure 5.2 plots both sets to illustrate
the similar coverage rates. The figures illustrate two methods of calculating coverage per
second. The first is by using the used wall time which would be the same value for all cores.
The second is by using cput which is the sum total of CPU time used by all processors.
Except for two outliers the results are consistent. This works in favor of scalability if the
framework gets access to more computing resources.
5.2.3 Example of lightweight jobs
Using the same clustering approach we can analyze the following set of jobs together
(45697668-45697677, 45697698-45697707, 45697728-45697737, and 45697758-45697767). All
40
Figure 5.2: Both 1 and 3 million record per core sets behave the in terms of coverage per
second
these jobs have the same parameter except for the random key and the requested walltime.
Looking at the job runs they all are able to finish and retrieve the random key in about 20
minutes. Booking walltime of 1, 2, 3, and 4 hours is too much for TotalM of 15728640 and
T of 1024 since the TotalM after being distributed amongst 1023 cores, is around 15,375
each.
Jobs (45697658-45697667, 45697688-45697697, 45697718-45697727, 45697748-45697757)
observation: All those lightweight with about a million record per core and with T at 1024
were successful. 7 cores were usable to the tables out of 8 and TotalM was 7,340,032. Jobs
(45697678-45697687, 45697708-45697717, 45697738-45697747, and 45697768-45697777) were
also successful using 32 cores (only 31 used for generation and search). TotalM was
32505856 which comes down to 1048576 per core.
5.2.4 Examples of unsuccessful job sets
Job 45697516: The walltime that was booked by the probing script and provided by the
GPC was not enough to finish. The job was kicked out while calculating the tables. The
overhead of the printing is large and the over all performance can be enhanced by decreas-
ing the output overhead. Other jobs (45697510 to 45697519) behave similarly. This means
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it is not a one time problem but rather with the same environment variables it will respond
similarly.
Job ID 45697515 is one of them and looking at the details they are more or less the
same except the random key is different. The framework failed to find the key even after
successfully finishing the search. This could be due to a bug. The generation and negative-
result search took about 1 hour 10 minute and was in the scope of the 2 hours walltime
booked from the GPC system. Appendix A show the set of jobs that also exhibited and
confirmed the same behavior.
Since there seemed to a pattern we tried to group the runs into cluster. This cluster
with the faulty results can be extended to cover similar runs with higher walltime. The
fact that they fail to reach the results but finish the run gracefully means that nothing is
going to change if the run has more walltime. To test this we look at the following jobs
(45697631-45697640, and 45697591-45697640). The behavior is consistent except for job
45697640. Considering the whole cluster of jobs, they all finishes in about 1:10 hours if
they had more than one hour of walltime booked. If the job had just one hour booked,
it is safe to assume that it was killed just around 10 minutes before it was finished. Job
45697640 stands out as an outlier and is an opportunity for more investigation.
Job 45697538 had an issue with the verification code. Jobs (45697530 to 45697537) act
similarly where the search is done in 35 minutes but now results were found. No leads or
partial matches were found which enforces the conclusion that it was a bug with setting
up the random key. Following the (walltime range) clustering method we can assume the
same behavior will happen in the following jobs (45697489-45697494, 45697496-45697499,
45697571-45697580, 45697611-45697620, 45786991-45786997, and 45787000). They all fin-
ish without being interrupted by GPC in 35 minutes without finding the key.
Jobs (46040577, 46040579, 46040581, and 46040594-46040597) finished without finding
the key, exhausting the walltime or issuing an error. Memory limits are assumed to be good
since initializing the SP was fine. Looking at the allocated memory, it is about 227BG if
we take the median 238314532KB.
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5.3 Job coverage in terms of main input variables
5.3.1 Pushing boundaries tactics or probing strategy
Deciding the chain length T and the number of start and end points M to increase the
success rate is - according to [25]- based on trial and error. Figure 5.3 shows the general
directions of probing that we tried in our work and it focuses on GPC resource boundaries
and the planned T and M . Since there are many variables that can be changed, we need to
narrow the space and start with some ranges of runs that would give some initial scoping.
This initial scoping is only achievable after reaching significant stability in the framework.
Figure 5.3: Probing the boundaries of GPC
5.3.2 Number of cores coverage
One of the objects of the first approach to analyze the results was to collect some indicators
about the coverage of the runs. This helped illustrating how far the capabilities of the
system were probed in different directions. Figure 5.4 shows the number of job runs versus
the number of cores used. e.g. the second bar means that it used 8 cores to cover about
180 runs. There were only 4 runs that used 64 cores, another 4 runs used 128 cores, and
no runs that used 256 cores.
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Figure 5.4: Run coverage of number the of cores used
5.3.3 Memory records M coverage
Figure 5.5 shows the number of runs versus the number of memory records TotalM used,
while Figure 5.6 shows the number of runs versus the number of memory records M
(TotalM per core C) used. Figure 5.7 shows the number of runs versus the number of
requested walltime hours, while figure 5.8 shows the number of runs versus the iterations
T (in other words rings within chains inside the tables) used.
Figure 5.5: Run coverage of the number of TotalM memory records
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Figure 5.6: Run coverage of the number of M memory records per core
5.4 Measuring changes in program behavior
5.4.1 Decreasing output density
Initial attempt
The output to file, like network and other IO, is handled by MPI. It was important to
execute runs that are not output dense and compare the results. We analyze the available
data and observe behavior as we exclude some clusters. Figure 5.9 plots all the jobs as
follows. Memory records (or number of chains) per core on the left Y axis and denoted
MperC is plotted in orange. Output density in bytes divided over CPU time (cput) per
core in seconds is plotted in blue on the right Y axis. X axis is the job description. Since
the records are sorted from low to high we expect the highest values on the right side.
The full data is not useful since it is visually hard to analyze and has invalid records. We
exclude the following and plot again in Figure 5.10 :
• Invalid entries (like division by zero due to data extraction problems).
• Records where TotalM is 10,000 records or less.
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Figure 5.7: Run coverage of the number of requested W walltime hours
Figure 5.8: Run coverage of the number of requested T iterations
• Records for jobs that aborted and/or failed to recover the validation key.
Figure 5.10 show the same plot after the exclusion. We discover a cluster with jobs that
have significantly high output density rate mostly due to high coverage (T ∗M) on the right
side. We exclude those and get a more focused data set in Figure 5.11 where we discover
two cluster, again on the right side, where we have contradicting behaviors for the relation
between MperC and the output density. We observer MperC was just over 3,000,000 while
output density was just over 4,000 byte per second per core, and then when MperC was just
over 1,000,000 the output density was just under 14,000 byte per second per core. We con-
clude that the two rates are not corelated and then exclude those clusters. The new subset
of data in Figure 5.12 shows that the MperC rate for most jobs is relatively less than that for
low output density jobs (which their names start with LowD on the X axis). This becomes
more apparent when looking at very low output density jobs (with VLowD at the bedining
on the job name on the X axis). Based on this analysis we observe that even though the
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Figure 5.9: Output density in bytes per average cput in seconds versus average M per core
for all jobs
MPI I/O operations are transparent to the program they do affect the rate at which we can
push it’s computation boundary. Observation: Some jobs were successful and some
were not. Regardless of how much walltime was asked for, the jobs that had T=4096,
C=1024, and M=1,072,693,248 finished in around 01:16:20 hours. Some jobs that had
T=4096, C=1024, and M=2,145,386,496 stopped after about 04:00:00 hours as the GPC
killed the jobs for going over the alloted time. This can be justified as M is twice the size.
Looking at the output file (Ex: LowD4096t1024c2145386496m4hrsbestCvrg0.o45941114),
the time expires while the child processes are generating the starting point. This sample
will be used to decrease the the test density further more and remeasure results.
Some jobs that had T=4096, C=1024, and M=2,145,386,496 Stopped after about
02:31:00 hours. It is not clear why they stopped but they stop around the same place
as the other failed jobs. That is, after running LFSR 2,097,152 times for starting points.
This prompted the algorithm to decrease output density further more. With 1024 cores we
are allowed 16 hours. The whole batch where TotalM= 2,145,386,496 records and W =
4:00:00 hours ran out of time. And so did the batch were TotalM=1,072,693,248 records
and W=4:00:00 hours.
Final attempt
We attempted to radically decrease the debug information especially for the Child pro-
cesses. Table 5.4.1 illustrates the results. We use 1023 instead of 1024 or 210 since we only
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Figure 5.10: Output density in bytes per average cput in seconds versus average M per
core for successful jobs
Figure 5.11: Output density in bytes per average cput in seconds versus average M per
core for subset 1 of successful jobs
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Figure 5.12: Output density in bytes per average cput in seconds versus average M per
core for subset 2 of successful jobs
used 1023 child cores for the cryptographic operations and one core is reserver for parent
operations.
T TotalM Observation Job ID Search
space
|S| = TM





1048576 2,145,386,496 fail the runs 46040586-
46040589
1023 ∗ 241
1048576 1,072,693,248 8 hours with




4096 1,072,693,248 successful 46040572 1023 ∗ 232
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5.4.2 False positives and collisions
Job 46040572 with 4096 T , and 4 hours run was successful. It finished in 1 hour 11 minutes,
found the Key but also found 5 false positive leads. Two of the keys were 0x6cc94a0fb8fe,
two were 0x3173e31408b3, and one was 0xcb59825b9174. Those false positives were in 5
different chains (different m records) and 2 pairs had the same values. This shows that
there is collision between chains. Figure 5.13 reflects the idea that having collision in
the false positives space could be an indication that the collision effect is bigger on the
tables. Collisions are very costly and there is no way for tracking this while the tables and
chains are being generated. We propose the parallel architecture for collision detection and
prevention in Section 4.7 for this reason.
Figure 5.13: Collisions in the false positive space could indicate a much larger collision in
the table/chain space
Job 46040573 with the same 4096 T , 4 hours, also finished in about 1 hour 11 minutes,
found the Key, and also found 9 false positive leads. Six of the false positives had the value
of 0xcc192590b40f which means a high level of collision. There is currently no way to tell
exactly what is the percentage of the collision because we do not record it. We only record
those that flagged as potential leads and by the definition they are a small percentage. So
we can derive that the overall collision is equal to or larger than the lead collision. The
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three other false alarms are unique.
Job 46040574 was successful without false positive leads. Job 46040575 found the
Key but also found 3 false positive leads. The three false positive leads are unique. Job
46040590 found the Key but also found 9 false positive leads. Two pairs had the same
values: 0x031cfabd2efd and 0xb8e6f7103b14, one value was lost in the extraction but is
recoverable, and the other 4 had unique values. Job 46040593 found the Key but also found
7 false positive leads, 3 unique, and two pairs are with same value. They all occurred at
different t,c, and m.
The most interesting case is job 46040591 which found the key but also found 18 false
positive leads. One false positive value (0xc715ed95a111) as a recovered key repeats 6 times
in 6 different chains (different m memory records). One repeats 3 times, two repeats twice,
and the rest of them are unique. Since this is a significantly larger set of false positives
we can compare t, c, and m to see if there is any relations. Figure 5.14 shows that only
one value repeats c = 42 which means that core 42 yielded 2 false positives at 2 different
chains in the same table, chain 1026006 and chain 1639710. Each happened at a different
iteration t, respectively, t = 599, and t = 1861. There are two scales in this figure. The left
scale is used to plot c which is the core instance presented by the orange color, and t which
is the iteration where the false positive happened and presented by the blue line. The right
scale is used to plot m which is the memory record where the false positive happened. For
example, the fifth false positive in the diagram show that when t was at 2442 in the 201st
core (c = 201) a false positive occurred in m (memory record 1825380).
Job 46040592 found the Key but also found 16 false positive leads. One false positive value
(0x356d35bca3ef) repeats 12 times in 12 different chains. The remaining 4 false positives
had unique values. This is also a significantly large set of false positives. We can compare
t, c, and m to see if there is any relations. Figure 5.15 shows that there is no overlap
between the false positive coordinates of t, c, and m. Meaning, false positives happened at
different iterations t, cores c, memory records m. The same two-scale graph type is used.
Left scale is used to plot the core c and the iteration t where the false positive happened
at. The right scale is used to plot the memory record m where the false positive happened.
For example the 15th false positive happened at c = 64, t = 757, and m = 539640.
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Figure 5.14: False positive plot for job 46040591
5.4.3 Changing encryption algorithms
One of the objectives of the framework was to compare similar runs in terms of key vari-
ables using different but comparable encryption algorithms. Since Speck is very similar to
Simeck it was an obvious choice. Speck jobs 46336986, 46336988, 46336987, and 46336985
were run using Speck and only one of them succeeded in retrieving the verification key.
The rate of false positives was very high compared to Simeck which lead to higher output
density and the inability to compare run times.
5.4.4 Measuring the effect of sort
The complexity of sorting algorithms have a significant penalty on the runs that are not par-
ticularly useful in this phase of the research as it entails comparing many runs. However,
it was also important to sample some runs with sorting enabled to draw some compar-
isons. The following jobs are comparable to jobs that had high output density for Simeck
52
Figure 5.15: False positive plot for job 46040592
(45940946-45940955, 45940966-45940975, 45940956-45940965, 45940976-45940985). The
general observation from those jobs that work which used to take a less than two hours,
now needs more than 8 hours. Indeed the program gets kicked out by GPC while sorting.
5.5 Search space coverage
Figure 5.16 shows search space coverage per second for all jobs, while Figure 5.17 shows
coverage per second for entries that are larger than 7,000,000,000. The plots illustrate
that there two major clusters. The relationship between virtual and physical memory is
consistent at a ration of about 1.8:1. In general the memory (virtual or real) per coverage
decreases as the coverage increases. This could be justified by the limited resources each
node has. This simple explanation, however, does not justify the significantly different
clusters illustrated for the 1.09844E+12 , 4.39375E+12, and 1.1248E+15 jobs. By coverage
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(potential maximum coverage) we mean the maximum number of unique blocks that the
job can potentially generate) as a ring within a chain within a table) and then use in the
search phase later on in the process.
Figure 5.16: Coverage per second for all jobs
Figure 5.17: Coverage per second for entries that are larger than 7,000,000,00
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5.6 Summary of results
To summarize, the TMTO-MPI algorithm exhibits consistency in behavior that means
that it would be scalable if more resources are used. The lesser the output density the
higher the potential coverage. The output density is a function of debug output and false
leads. False positives exist and will differ for different runs. The collision of false positives
is an indicator of a potentially larger collision issue. The solution to the collision issue is




Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Summary of contribution
6.1.1 Framework development
We have shown in this work that we can build a framework to research TMTO attack
against different ciphers in MPI environment called a TMTO-MPI algorithm. Based on
the known research in the literature, we define the components of TMTO-MPI algorithm
as follows:
1. Individual run creation and submission.
2. Probing different variable via multi-run script.
3. Key variables initialization.
4. Parallel communication.
5. Quota distribution.
6. Starting points random initialization.
7. Calculating endpoints through iterative encryption.
8. Reduction or expansion function.
9. Sorting component.
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10. Collision detection or minimization component.
11. Challenge preparation.
12. Saving and loading from disks.
13. Key search.
14. False positive leads handling and key verification.
15. Result analysis.
The algorithm for TMTO-MPI is defined in Section 4.3 which covers the internal and
parallel part of the framework. The external part of the framework cover components 1,
2, and 15. Components 10 and 12 were not implemented but we have proposed another
algorithm in Section 4.7 to solve this issue. The TMTO problem can be almost completely
parallelized. The exception is the first phase of initialization which is used to generate the
master LFSR table that is used as a seed for the child processes to generate their own
LFSR. Using this technique in this phase is not entirely necessary and we have proposed
some other techniques to increase that can increase the performance.
6.1.2 Design Rationale
We identified the differences between this work that is based on parallel computing the
original work by Hellman [6] that was not parallel in Section 4.6. We have discussed key
concepts, important variables, algorithm, structure, and phases. For example, to build
such framework we needed the following two features:
1. Using XOR for framework robustness. One of the lessons learned about building
a cryptanalysis framework is the use of XOR based mock cipher which can be used to
test the framework stability. XOR is very simple and can be adapted to different block
sizes. It can provide a good bench mark to compare any cryptographic algorithm
against. It will also make the debugging much easier and help detect and verify fixes
for memory leaks, out of memory conditions, and segmentation faults.
2. Verifying algorithm accuracy. While XOR mock cipher is very good for verifying
algorithm stability and scalability it does not help with verifying false positives or
that the generation and verification works as expected. The reason is that XOR
in this TMTO scenario will keep iterating between two values. We can solve this
by injecting the challenge in the tables. We used this extensively for our runs and
currently the framework supports injecting the challenge as a starting point.
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6.1.3 Testing
We explained our probing technique to test the limitation of this framework and our
approach for results analysis (individual, overall and clusters). We’ve discussed some of
the search space coverage rates, successful as well as failed jobs, coverage in terms of
main variables, false positives and collisions. The following are some of the relations we’ve
discussed:
1. Run times for different ciphers. We expected there would be difference in run
times between different ciphers. This indeed happens but mostly -if not solely- due
to the effect of different output density caused by different rates of false leads. These
results are not conclusive since we only ran few results for Speck but the interesting
result here is that: while comparing run times for different ciphers the density of
output at the same debug level must be considered. It could eventually prove to be a
strength or weakness in the cipher. We modified the input to the two cryptographic
algorithms to accept 48 bits as both the key size as well as the plain text and cipher
text size.
2. Limitations. In this work, the successful tests had a maximum of 2048 cores booked.
The GPC and the new Niagara systems allow for more cores to be booked and
to increase the coverage of the framework. It is however more important to find
ways to measure, understand, and minimize chain collisions before trying to scale
the coverage. The reason this has more priority is that by scaling (increasing) the
coverage the system might result in more chain collisions which will not even be
detectable unless they cause false leads.
3. Output density. The density of the output has significant impact on the response
time of the run. Since this is a research framework it is expected to have multiple
debug levels to stabilize and validate different approaches. However, when the pur-
pose of the run is to calculate and compare timing, it is important to minimize the
output or debug level.
6.1.4 Proposal for a fine grained algorithm for collision detection
and prevention
While analyzing the run results it became obvious that the most critical point in the
success of such attack is collision avoidance. At the beginning of the development phase
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we used randomization to initialize the values of the starting points and then we changed
the approach to use LFSR to guarantee uniques starting points. We do not have an exact
way of measuring collisions but there is an alarming fact that there are many false lead
that are equal. Regardless of the root cause of these leads, the fact that they are similar
indicate a potential previous and a sure forward chain collision. In the future work we
would like to explore the technique proposed in Section 4.7 in Chapter 4, i.e. , proposal to
use fine-grained parallel algorithm for effectively detecting and avoiding collisions.
6.2 Future Work
The components defined for the framework are not fully explored. To advance this work
we can increase the number of ciphers it supports. We can also write a key-reduction-
expansion function. To make the job runs interruptible we can add a feature that supports
job preemption by writing to and reading from disk. Support more LFSR polynomials for
different sizes of blocks. Support different chain sizes and distinguished points. For the
external structure we can add a feature for queue time prediction. Also, adapt to, and use
more computing capabilities in the new Niagara system. Most importantly, implementing
the new fine grained proposal for TMTO-MPI algorithm.
59
References
[1] Lidong Chen and Guang Gong. Communication system security. CRC press, 2012.
[2] Masumeh Damrudi and Norafida Ithnin. An optimization of tree topology based
parallel cryptography. Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2012, 2012.
[3] A. Murat Fiskiran and Ruby B. Lee. Fast parallel table lookups to accelerate
symmetric-key cryptography. In Information Technology: Coding and Computing,
2005. ITCC 2005. International Conference on, volume 1, pages 526–531. IEEE, 2005.
[4] Sedeeq Hassn Albana Ali Al-Khazraji. Using parallel computing to implement security
attack. International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security, 13(8):35,
2015.
[5] General purpose cluster (GPC) quickstart. https://wiki.scinet.utoronto.ca/wi
ki/index.php/GPC_Quickstart.
[6] Martin Hellman. A cryptanalytic time-memory trade-off. IEEE transactions on In-
formation Theory, 26(4):401–406, 1980.
[7] CISSP Steven Hernandez. Official (ISC) 2 guide to the CISSP CBK. CRC Press,
2009.
[8] Philippe Oechslin. Making a faster cryptanalytic time-memory trade-off. In Annual
International Cryptology Conference, pages 617–630. Springer, 2003.
[9] Franc¸ois-Xavier Standaert, Gael Rouvroy, Jean-Jacques Quisquater, and Jean-Didier
Legat. A time-memory tradeoff using distinguished points: New analysis & fpga
results. In CHES, volume 2523, pages 593–609. Springer, 2002.
[10] Mark Stamp. Once upon a time-memory tradeoff. San Jose State University, Depart-
ment of Computer Science, 2003.
60
[11] Alex Biryukov. Some thoughts on time-memory-data tradeoffs. IACR Cryptology
ePrint Archive, 2005:207, 2005.
[12] Jin Hong, Kyung Chul Jeong, Eun Young Kwon, In-Sok Lee, and Daegun Ma. Variants
of the distinguished point method for cryptanalytic time memory trade-offs. In Inter-
national Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience, pages 131–145.
Springer, 2008.
[13] Gildas Avoine, Pascal Junod, and Philippe Oechslin. Time-memory trade-offs: False
alarm detection using checkpoints. In INDOCRYPT, volume 3797, pages 183–196.
Springer, 2005.
[14] Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov. Fast dictionary attacks on passwords using
time-space tradeoff. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and
communications security, pages 364–372. ACM, 2005.
[15] Alex Biryukov, Sourav Mukhopadhyay, and Palash Sarkar. Improved time-memory
trade-offs with multiple data. In Selected Areas in Cryptography, volume 3897, pages
110–127. Springer, 2005.
[16] Nele Mentens, Lejla Batina, Bart Preneel, and Ingrid Verbauwhede. Time-memory
trade-off attack on FPGA platforms: Unix password cracking. ARC, 3985:323–334,
2006.
[17] Elad Barkan, Eli Biham, and Adi Shamir. Rigorous bounds on cryptanalytic
time/memory tradeoffs. In CRYPTO, volume 4117, pages 1–21. Springer, 2006.
[18] Daegun Ma and Jin Hong. Success probability of the hellman trade-off. Information
Processing Letters, 109(7):347–351, 2009.
[19] Jin Hong. The cost of false alarms in hellman and rainbow tradeoffs. Designs, Codes
and Cryptography, 57(3):293–327, 2010.
[20] Ehud D. Karnin. A parallel algorithm for the knapsack problem. IEEE Transactions
on Computers, (5):404–408, 1984.
[21] Hamid Reza Amirazizi and Martin E. Hellman. Time-memory-processor trade-offs.
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 34(3):505–512, 1988.
[22] Henry Ker-Chang Chang, Jonathan Jen-Rong Chen, and Shyong-Jian Shyu. A par-
allel algorithm for the knapsack problem using a generation and searching technique.
Parallel Computing, 20(2):233–243, 1994.
61
[23] Ken-Li Li, Ren-Fa Li, and Qing-Hua Li. Optimal parallel algorithms for the knapsack
problem without memory conflicts. Journal of Computer Science and Technology,
19(6):760–768, 2004.
[24] Edward R. Sykes and Wesley Skoczen. An improved parallel implementation of rain-
bowcrack using mpi. Journal of Computational Science, 5(3):536–541, 2014.
[25] Michael S. Taber. Distributed pre-computation for a cryptanalytic time-memory
trade-off. 2008.
[26] Amos Fiat and Moni Naor. Rigorous time/space tradeoffs for inverting functions.
In Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing,
pages 534–541. ACM, 1991.
[27] Markku-Juhani Olavi Saarinen. A time-memory tradeoff attack against lili-128. In
International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, pages 231–236. Springer, 2002.
[28] T.E. Bjørstad. Cryptanalysis of grain using time/memory/data tradeoffs. on Estream
Phase, 3, 2013.
[29] Itai Dinur. Cryptanalytic time-memory-data tradeoffs for fx-constructions with ap-
plications to prince and pride. In EUROCRYPT (1), pages 231–253, 2015.
[30] Alex Biryukov and Adi Shamir. Cryptanalytic time/memory/data tradeoffs for stream
ciphers. In International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and
Information Security, pages 1–13. Springer, 2000.
[31] Orr Dunkelman and Nathan Keller. Treatment of the initial value in time-memory-
data tradeoff attacks on stream ciphers. Information Processing Letters, 107(5):133–
137, 2008.
[32] Vrizlynn L.L. Thing and Hwei-Ming Ying. A novel time-memory trade-off method for
password recovery. digital investigation, 6:S114–S120, 2009.
[33] Dorothy Elizabeth Robling Denning. Cryptography and data security. Addison-Wesley
Longman Publishing Co., Inc., 1982.
[34] Johan Borst, Bart Preneel, and Joos Vandewalle. On the time-memory tradeoff be-
tween exhaustive key search and table precomputation. In Symposium on Information
Theory in the Benelux, pages 111–118. Technische Universiteit Delft, 1998.
62
[35] Jean-Jacques Quisquater, Francois-Xavier Standaert, Gael Rouvroy, Jean-Pierre
David, and Jean-Didier Legat. A cryptanalytic time-memory tradeoff: First fpga
implementation. In FPL, volume 2438, pages 780–789. Springer, 2002.
[36] Gildas Avoine, Pascal Junod, and Philippe Oechslin. Characterization and improve-
ment of time-memory trade-off based on perfect tables. ACM Transactions on Infor-
mation and System Security (TISSEC), 11(4):17, 2008.
[37] Jin Hong and Palash Sarkar. Rediscovery of time memory tradeoffs. IACR Cryptology
ePrint Archive, 2005:90, 2005.
[38] Gangqiang Yang, Bo Zhu, Valentin Suder, Mark D. Aagaard, and Guang Gong. The
simeck family of lightweight block ciphers. In International Workshop on Crypto-
graphic Hardware and Embedded Systems, pages 307–329. Springer, 2015.
[39] Message passing interface. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Message_Passing_In
terface.
[40] Bo Zhu. Reference code for the simeck family of block ciphers. https://github.com
/bozhu/Simeck, 2015.
[41] Ray Beaulieu, Stefan Treatman-Clark, Douglas Shors, Bryan Weeks, Jason Smith,
and Louis Wingers. The SIMON and SPECK lightweight block ciphers. In Design
Automation Conference (DAC), 2015 52nd ACM/EDAC/IEEE, pages 1–6. IEEE,
2015.
[42] Sebastian Gesemann. Reference code for the speck family of block ciphers. http://
github.com/GaloisInc/saw-script/blob/master/examples/simon-speck, 2013.
[43] Nurdan Saran and Ali Doganaksoy. Choosing parameters to achieve a higher success
rate for hellman time memory trade off attack. In Availability, Reliability and Security,
2009. ARES’09. International Conference on, pages 504–509. IEEE, 2009.
[44] Ruakh. Replace one substring for another string in shell script. https:
//stackoverflow.com/questions/13210880/replace-one-substring-for-an
other-string-in-shell-script, 2012.




[46] Rob I. How to split one string into multiple variables in bash shell?
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/10520623/how-to-split-one-stri
ng-into-multiple-variables-in-bash-shell, 2012.




[49] user3101398. How to decrypt simple XOR encryption. http://stackoverflow.com/
questions/20579363/how-to-decrypt-simple-xor-encryption, 2013.
[50] Paul Griffiths. How to convert a char array to a uint16 t by casting type
pointer? http://stackoverflow.com/questions/27558956/how-to-convert-a-
char-array-to-a-uint16-t-by-casting-type-pointer, 2014.
[51] Steven Sudit. Convert a uint16-t to char[2] to be sent over socket
(unix). http://stackoverflow.com/questions/13279024/convert-a-uint16-t-t
o-char2-to-be-sent-over-socket-unix, 2012.
[52] C passing array of structure to function. http://www.c4learn.com/c-programmin
g/c-passing-array-of-structure-to-function.
[53] strcmp. http://en.cppreference.com/w/c/string/byte/strcmp.
[54] Ofir Carny. How to convert integer to char in C? http://stackoverflow.com/ques
tions/2279379/how-to-convert-integer-to-char-in-c, 2010.
[55] Qwertz. How to convert integer to string in C? http://stackoverflow.com/questi
ons/9655202/how-to-convert-integer-to-string-in-c, 2012.
[56] John Bode. How do i create an array of strings in C? http://stackoverflow.com/
questions/1088622/how-do-i-create-an-array-of-strings-in-c, 2009.
[57] Alexandre Jasmin. Dynamic memory for 2D char array. http://stackoverflow.co
m/questions/2614249/dynamic-memory-for-2d-char-array, 2010.
[58] Francis Lavergne. Dynamic memory allocation in MPI. http://stackoverflow.co
m/questions/25628321/dynamic-memory-allocation-in-mpi, 2014.
64
[59] Jonathan Dursi. Sending and receiving 2D array over MPI. http://stackoverflow.
com/questions/5901476/sending-and-receiving-2d-array-over-mpi, 2011.





[63] Dwhitney67. Get process ID in C. https://ubuntuforums.org/showthread.php?t=
1430052, 2010.
[64] Manish Bhojasia. C program to print the program name and all its arguments. http:
//www.sanfoundry.com/c-program-print-program-name-and-arguments.
[65] C library function - strcmp(). https://www.tutorialspoint.com/c_standard_li
brary/c_function_strcmp.htm.
[66] Forrest Hoffman. Using derived data types with MPI. http://www.linux-mag.com/
id/1332, 2003.
[67] Solomon W Golomb and Guang Gong. Signal design for good correlation: for wireless
communication, cryptography, and radar. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[68] Hiroshi Haramoto, Makoto Matsumoto, and Pierre L’Ecuyer. A fast jump ahead
algorithm for linear recurrences in a polynomial space. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, 5203:290, 2008.
[69] Linear-feedback shift register. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear-feedbac
k_shift_register.
[70] Axel Kemper. Galois LFSR explanation of code. http://stackoverflow.com/ques
tions/16891655/galois-lfsr-explanation-of-code, 2013.
[71] Paxdiablo. Display the binary representation of a number in C? http:
//stackoverflow.com/questions/699968/display-the-binary-representa
tion-of-a-number-in-c, 2009.
[72] Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell. Introduction to modern cryptography. CRC press,
2014.
65
[73] Charles P. Pfleeger and Shari Lawrence Pfleeger. Security in computing. Prentice Hall
Professional Technical Reference, 2002.
[74] Sabari Pramanik and Sanjit Kumar Setua. Dna cryptography. In Electrical & Com-
puter Engineering (ICECE), 2012 7th International Conference on, pages 551–554.
IEEE, 2012.
[75] Jin Hong and Palash Sarkar. New applications of time memory data tradeoffs. In
Asiacrypt, volume 3788, pages 353–372. Springer, 2005.
[76] Sourav Mukhopadhyay and Palash Sarkar. Application of LFSRs in time/memory
trade-off cryptanalysis. In International Workshop on Information Security Applica-






A.1 Arbitrary sample and cluster analysis
A.1.1 The first batch
Job ID 45697540
The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
The job was finished properly
-- lead at t=1 core=1, m=0, key 1st B_l_
-- Orig PT:_[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]_




-- Orig CT:_[9][39]__[][1e]__[ ][09]__[ ][91]__[][01]__[ ][e8]_
-- Orig Key:_[l][6c]__[p][70]__[L][4c]__[f][66]__[N][4e]__[8][38]_
-- CT 4 verify:_[9][39]__[][1e]__[ ][09]__[][91]__[][01]__[][e8]_
-- We have Verification also.
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: [0_6c_l][1_70_p][2_4c_L][3_66_f][4_4e_N][5_38_8] and it is
used as the start point of the first chain.
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After encrypting the plaintext T times (1024) the chain end point becomes
: ___[98]___[5b]___[1c]___[06]___[bb]___[ed]
Ciphertext Challenge: [0_39_9][1_1e_][2_09_ ][3 _91_ ][4_01_][5 _e8_ ]
CT decrypts back to: [0_50_P][1_54_T][2_50_P][3_54_T][4_50_P][5_54_T]
output log: tmto1024t1024c3218079744m2hrs_bestCvrg0.o45697540
Output size (printf overhead): 315279 lines , 15924859 characters.
error log: tmto1024t1024c3218079744m2hrs_bestCvrg0.e45697540






source code file: tmt_Fri_Oct_20_21_18_35_EDT_2017_M=3218079744_C=1024_W=2
_00_00_T=1024_B=48_E=2_H=0_L=0_S=1_
R=GPC__notes=tmto1024t1024c3218079744m2hrs_bestCvrg0.c























Observation: Key was retrieved in around 53 minutes. This is the worst scenario key
retrieval time for this set of key environment variables. Jobs 45697540, 45697541, 45697543,
45697545, 45697546, 45697547, 45697548, and 45697549 have also exhibited very similar

































lead at t=1 core=1, m=0, key1stB_l_
Orig PT:_[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]_
Found CT:_[ ][98]__[[][5b]__[][1c]__[][06]__[][bb]__[ ][ed]_
Recovered Key(EP-1):_[l][6c]__[p][70]__[L][4c]__[f][66]__[N][4e]__[8][38]_
Chain SP:_[l][6c]__[p][70]__[L][4c]__[f][66]__[N][4e]__[8][38]_
Orig CT:_[9][39]__[][1e]__[ ][09]__[ ][91]__[][01]__[ ][e8]_
Orig Key:_[l][6c]__[p][70]__[L][4c]__[f][66]__[N][4e]__[8][38]_
CT 4 verify:_[9][39]__[][1e]__[ ][09]__[ ][91]__[][01]__[ ][e8]_
We have Verification also.
tmto1024t1024c3218079744m2hrs_bestCvrg0.o45697541:
lead at t=1 core=1, m=0, key1stB_P_
Orig PT:_[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]_
Found CT:_[ ][80]__[][19]__[ ][b5]__[G][47]__[ ][c2]__[ ][af]_
Recovered Key(EP-1):_[P][50]__[J][4a]__[S][53]__[c][63]__[i][69]__[N][4e]_
Chain SP:_[P][50]__[J][4a]__[S][53]__[c][63]__[i][69]__[N][4e]_
Orig CT:_[F][46]__[ ][e4]__[][02]__[][0e]__[ ][f6]__[ ][b2]_
Orig Key:_[P][50]__[J][4a]__[S][53]__[c][63]__[i][69]__[N][4e]_
CT 4 verify:_[F][46]__[ ][e4]__[][02]__[][0e]__[][f6]__[ ][b2]_
We have Verification also.
tmto1024t1024c3218079744m2hrs_bestCvrg0.o45697542:
lead at t=1 core=1, m=0, key1stB_Q_ Orig PT:_[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T
][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]_
Found CT:_[ ][a7]__[ ][fd]__[ ][86]__[ ][8b]__[ ][b1]__[ ][ec]_
Recovered Key(EP-1):_[Q][51]__[0][30]__[H][48]__[6][36]__[z][7a]__[9][39]_
Chain SP:_[Q][51]__[0][30]__[H][48]__[6][36]__[z][7a]__[9][39]_
Orig CT:_[ ][ac]__[ ][8c]__[!][21]__[)][29]__[q][71]__[v][76]_
Orig Key:_[Q][51]__[0][30]__[H][48]__[6][36]__[z][7a]__[9][39]_
CT 4 verify:_[ ][ac]__[ ][8c]__[!][21]__[)][29]__[q][71]__[v][76]_
We have Verification also.
tmto1024t1024c3218079744m2hrs_bestCvrg0.o45697543:Yaaaay lead at t=1 core
=1, m=0, key1stB_a_
Orig PT:_[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]_




Orig CT:_[ ][a7]__[ ][ee]__[d][64]__[ ][c5]__[ ][a4]__[ ][86]_
Orig Key:_[a][61]__[R][52]__[r][72]__[n][6e]__[K][4b]__[p][70]_
CT 4 verify:_[ ][a7]__[ ][ee]__[d][64]__[ ][c5]__[ ][a4]__[ ][86]_
We have Verification also.
tmto1024t1024c3218079744m2hrs_bestCvrg0.o45697544:
lead at t=1 core=1, m=0, key1stB_m_
Orig PT:_[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]_
Found CT:_[ ][ef]__[][1c]__[-][2d]__[][b5]__[ ][b9]__[ ][20]_
Recovered Key(EP-1):_[m][6d]__[m][6d]__[Q][51]__[k][6b]__[d][64]__[x][78]_
Chain SP:_[m][6d]__[m][6d]__[Q][51]__[k][6b]__[d][64]__[x][78]_
Orig CT:_[ ][8d]__[w][77]__[ ][e8]__[ ][9f]__[][07]__[{][7b]_
Orig Key:_[m][6d]__[m][6d]__[Q][51]__[k][6b]__[d][64]__[x][78]_
CT 4 verify:_[ ][8d]__[w][77]__[ ][e8]__[ ][9f]__[][07]__[{][7b]_
We have Verification also.
tmto1024t1024c3218079744m2hrs_bestCvrg0.o45697545:
lead at t=1 core=1, m=0, key1stB_7_
Orig PT:_[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]_





CT 4 verify:_[H][48]__[I][49]__[][a3]__[ ][95]__[][03]__[+][2b]_







We have Verification also.
tmto1024t1024c3218079744m2hrs_bestCvrg0.o45697547:
lead at t=1 core=1, m=0, key1stB_v_
Orig PT:_[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]_
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CT 4 verify:_[][0b]__[][04]__[][f6]__[][14]__[ ][c5]__[s][73]_
We have Verification also.
tmto1024t1024c3218079744m2hrs_bestCvrg0.o45697548:
lead at t=1 core=1, m=0, key1stB_b_
Orig PT:_[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]_






We have Verification also.
tmto1024t1024c3218079744m2hrs_bestCvrg0.o45697549:
lead at t=1 core=1, m=0, key1stB_c_
Orig PT:_[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]_
Found CT:_[)][29]__[ ][88]__[3][33]__[&][26]__[][dc]__[ ][ee]_
Recovered Key(EP-1):_[c][63]__[s][73]__[m][6d]__[8][38]__[6][36]__[X][58]_
Chain SP:_[c][63]__[s][73]__[m][6d]__[8][38]__[6][36]__[X][58]_
Orig CT:_[ ][20]__[y][79]__[][92]__[ ][a3]__[ ][d1]__[ ][8c]_
Orig Key:_[c][63]__[s][73]__[m][6d]__[8][38]__[6][36]__[X][58]_
CT 4 verify:_[ ][20]__[y][79]__[][92]__[ ][a3]__[ ][d1]__[ ][8c]_
We have Verification also.
Applying the same (walltime range) clustering approach we can assume the same behavior
would manifest in the following jobs (o45697630 45697629 45697628 45697627 45697626
45697624 45697625 45697623 45697621 45697622 45697590 45697589 45697588 45697583
45697587 45697586 45697585 45697584 45697582 45697581 45697509 45697508 45697507
45697505 45697506 45697504 45697503 45697502 45697501 45697500).
45697630
=>> PBS: job killed: walltime 14428 exceeded limit 14400
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=>> PBS: job killed: walltime 10806 exceeded limit 10800













































































CT 4 verify:_[M-I][c9]__[M-*][aa]__[M-7][b7]__[^C][03]__[M-5][b5]__[ ][09]
_










































































CT 4 verify:_[ ][20]__[f][66]__[M-$][a4]__[M-{][fb]__[M-^K][8b]__[M-)][a9]
_








































































Observation: at a total M of 3,218,079,744 and T of 1024, after dividing total M over 1023
child cores for a 3,145,728 per core we get a finish time of about 53 minutes which means
that all runs with 1, 2, 3, or 4 walltime will succeed.
A.1.2 The 1G M records batch
Job ID 45697610 45697609 45697608 45697607 45697606 45697605 45697604 45697603
45697602 45697601 45697568 45697569 45697570 45697567 45697566 45697565 45697562
45697564 45697563 45697561 45697529 45697528 45697527 45697526 45697525 45697524
45697523 45697522 45697521 45697520 45697657 45697656 45697655 45697654 45697653
45697652 45697651 45697650 45697649 45697648 45697488 45697487 45697486 45697485
45697484 45697483 45697482 45697481 45697480 45697479
The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
The job were successful.
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (multiple- see below) and it is used as the start point of the
first chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1024) the chain end point becomes
: (multiple- see below)
Ciphertext Challenge: (multiple- see below)
CT decrypts back to: (multiple- see below)
output log: (multiple)





















Observation: 1072693248 total M with 1023 cores means 1048576 per core.
45697610




































































































































































CT 4 verify:_[ ][09]__[M-^S][93]__[M-]][dd]__[=][3d]__[M-A][c1]__[M-<][bc]
_
























































CT 4 verify:_[M-[][db]__[^O][0f]__[M-+][ab]__[s][73]__[ ][09]__[M-F][c6]_














































































CT 4 verify:_[R][52]__[I][49]__[ ][20]__[M-^E][85]__[M-^L][8c]__[a][61]_














































































































CT 4 verify:_[M-9][b9]__[M-k][eb]__[M- ][a0]__[^C][03]__[M->][be]__[M-^N
][8e]_











[Identifies script extraction error due to special characters in the
output.]
45697656






















































































































CT 4 verify:_[ ][09]__[M-\][dc]__[i][69]__[M-@][c0]__[.][2e]__[M-L][cc]_

























































[Identified script extraction error]
45697484



















































































A.1.3 The 4G M records faulty batch
Job ID 45697516
The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
The job was killed for exceeding the requested walltime (3630 exceeded
limit 3600).
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: [0_6e_n][1_55_U][2_42_B][3_75_u][4_43_C][5_61_a] and it is
used as the start point of the first chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1024) the chain end point becomes
___[e4]___[fe]___[73]___[99]___[1b]___[0c]
Ciphertext Challenge: [0_da_][1_4f_O][2 _be_ ][3 _b1_ ][4_97_~W][5_7e_~]
CT decrypts back to: [0_50_P][1_54_T][2_50_P][3_54_T][4_50_P][5_54_T]
Output log: tmto1024t1024c4290772992m1hrs_bestCvrg0.o45697516






source code file: tmt_Fri_Oct_20_21_18_09_EDT_2017_M=4290772992_C=1024_W=1
_00_00_T=1024_B=48_E=2_H=0_L=0_S=1_R=GPC__notes=
tmto1024t1024c4290772992m1hrs_bestCvrg0.c





















Observations: The walltime that was booked by the probing script and provided by the
GPC was not enough to finish. The job was kicked out while calculating the tables. The
overhead of the printing is large and the over all performance can be enhanced by de-
creasing the output overhead. Similar jobs o45697519, o45697518, o45697517, o45697516,
o45697515, o45697513, o45697514, o45697511, o45697510, o45697512 behave similarly.
This means it is ot a one time problem but rather with the same environment variables it
will respond similarly.
e45697510:=>> PBS: job killed: walltime 3622 exceeded limit 3600
106
e45697511:=>> PBS: job killed: walltime 3630 exceeded limit 3600
e45697512:=>> PBS: job killed: walltime 3637 exceeded limit 3600
e45697513:=>> PBS: job killed: walltime 3630 exceeded limit 3600
e45697514:=>> PBS: job killed: walltime 3609 exceeded limit 3600
e45697515:=>> PBS: job killed: walltime 3634 exceeded limit 3600
e45697516:=>> PBS: job killed: walltime 3630 exceeded limit 3600
e45697517:=>> PBS: job killed: walltime 3642 exceeded limit 3600
e45697518:=>> PBS: job killed: walltime 3629 exceeded limit 3600
e45697519:=>> PBS: job killed: walltime 3612 exceeded limit 3600
Job ID 45697515 is one of them and looking at the details they are more or less the
same except the random key is different
The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
The job was killed for exceeding the requested walltime (3634 exceeded
limit 3600).
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: [0_65_e][1_55_U][2_51_Q][3_67_g][4_6b_k][5_64_d] and it is
used as the start point of the first chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1024) the chain end point becomes
: ___[a1]___[57]___[54]___[3d]___[d6]___[a4]
Ciphertext Challenge: [0_d2_][1 _a2_ ][2_77_w][3_4d_M][4_7e_~][5_c4_]
CT decrypts back to: [0_50_P][1_54_T][2_50_P][3_54_T][4_50_P][5_54_T] so
we know that there is nothing wrong with the crypto system.
output log: tmto1024t1024c4290772992m1hrs_bestCvrg0.o45697515





source code file: tmt_Fri_Oct_20_21_18_08_EDT_2017_M=4290772992_C=1024_W=1
_00_00_T=1024_B=48_E=2_H=0_L=0_S=1_R=GPC__notes=
tmto1024t1024c4290772992m1hrs_bestCvrg0.c























The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: [0_38_8][1_59_Y][2_52_R][3_48_H][4_78_x][5_62_b] and it is
used as the start point of the first chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1024), the chain end point becomes
: ___[0c]___[73]___[6a]___[3a]___[93]___[c4]
Ciphertext Challenge: [0_ba_][1 _a2_ ][2 _bf_ ][3 _ec_ ][4 _ab_ ][5_7e_~]
CT decrypts back to: [0_50_P][1_54_T][2_50_P][3_54_T][4_50_P][5_54_T]
output log: tmto1024t1024c4290772992m2hrs_bestCvrg0.o45697550
Output size (printf overhead): 64586 lines and 4962731 characters.
Error log: tmto1024t1024c4290772992m2hrs_bestCvrg0.e45697550
Error log looks fine. Nothing than the depcation error "Using mlock






























Observation: The framework failed to find the key even after successfully finishing the
search. This could be due to a bug. The generation and negative-result search took about
1 hour 10 minute and was in the scope of the 2 hours walltime booked from the GPC





























Since there seemed to a pattern we tried to group the runs into cluster. This cluster
with the faulty results can be extended to cover similar runs with higher walltime. The
fact that they fail to reach the results but finish the run gracefully means that nothing is
going to change if the run has more walltime. To test this we look at the the following jobs
(45697640 45697639 45697637 45697636 45697638 45697635 45697634 45697633 45697632
45697631 45697600 45697599 45697598 45697594 45697597 45697596 45697595 45697592
45697593 45697591).
45697640




















































































The behavior is consistent except for job 45697640. Considering the whole cluster of jobs,
they all finishes in about 1:10 hours if they had more than one hour of walltime booked.
If the job had just one hour booked it it safe to assume that it was killed just around 10
minutes before it was finished. Job 45697640 stands out as an outlier and is an opportunity
for more investigation.
A.1.4 The 15Mega M batch
Using the same clustering approach we can analyze the following set of jobs together
(o45697767 o45697766 o45697765 o45697762 o45697764 o45697763 o45697761 o45697759
o45697760 o45697758 o45697735 o45697737 o45697736 o45697733 o45697734 o45697732
o45697731 o45697730 o45697728 o45697729 o45697706 o45697707 o45697704 o45697705
o45697703 o45697702 o45697701 o45697700 o45697699 o45697698 o45697676 o45697677
o45697672 o45697673 o45697671 o45697674 o45697675 o45697668 o45697670 o45697669).
All these jobs have the same parameter except for the random key and the requested
walltime.
Job ID (multiple)
The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
All jobs achieved the whole cycle. They were able to initiate, distribute,




After encrypting the plaintext T times (1024) the chain end point becomes
: (multiple)
Ciphertext Challenge:(multiple)
CT decrypts back to: PTPTPT
output log: (multiple)






















Observation: Looking at the following runs they all are able to finish and retrieve the
random key in about 20 minutes. Booking walltime of 1, 2, 3, and 4 hours is too much
for M of 15728640 and T of 1024 since the M is total and after being distributed amongst
1023 core it is around 15,375 each.
45697767
































































































































































































































































































































































CT 4 verify:_[M- ][a0]__[M-^D][84]__[$][24]__[M-?][bf]__[M-1][b1]__[M
-^^][9e]_


















































CT 4 verify:_[t][74]__[M-.][ae]__[M- ][a0]__[M-^Z][9a]__[M-‘][e0]__[M-^B
][82]_









































































































A.1.5 The 2G M batch
Job ID 45697538
The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
The job was finished in 0:35:29 minutes but did not find the Key.
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: [0_53_S][1_39_9][2_46_F][3_4e_N][4_71_q][5_72_r] and it is
used as the start point of the first chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1024) the chain end point becomes
: ___[0c]___[12]___[9b]___[41]___[f0]___[6f]
Ciphertext Challenge: [0_cc_][1_83_~C][2 _e1_ ][3_14_^T][4_4f_O][5_8d_~M]
CT decrypts back to: [0_50_P][1_54_T][2_50_P][3_54_T][4_50_P][5_54_T]
output log: tmto1024t1024c2145386496m2hrs_bestCvrg0.o45697538
Output size (printf overhead): 43101 lines, 3321620 characters.





source code file: tmt_Fri_Oct_20_21_18_33_EDT_2017_M=2145386496_C=1024_W=2
_00_00_T=1024_B=48_E=2_H=0_L=0_S=1_R=GPC__notes=
tmto1024t1024c2145386496m2hrs_bestCvrg0.c






















Observations: There was and issue with the verification code. Jobs o45697537, o45697536,
o45697535, o45697534, o45697533, o45697532, o45697531, o45697530 act similarly where





























No leads or partial matches were found which enforces the conclusion that it was a bug
with setting up the random key. Following the (walltime range) clustering method we can
assume the same behavior will happen in the followin jobs (45787000 45786997 45786996
45786995 45786994 45786993 45786992 45786991 45697620 45697619 45697618 45697617
45697616 45697615 45697614 45697613 45697612 45697611 45697580 45697579 45697578
45697577 45697576 45697575 45697574 45697573 45697571 45697572 45697499 45697498






























































































































































Observation: The all finish without being interrupted by GPC in 35 minutes without
finding the key.
A.1.6 Million M per core 1024t 8c 7,340,032m
Job ID 45697756 45697757 45697755 45697754 45697753 45697752 45697751 45697750
45697749 45697748 45697727 45697726 45697724 45697725 45697723 45697722 45697721
45697720 45697719 45697718 45697694 45697697 45697693 45697695 45697696 45697692
45697691 45697690 45697689 45697688 45697666 45697667 45697662 45697663 45697660
45697664 45697661 45697658 45697659 45697665
The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (Multiple) and it is used as the start point of the first chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (Multiple) the chain end point becomes
: (Multiple)
Ciphertext Challenge: (Multiple)
CT decrypts back to: (Multiple)
output log: (Multiple)






















Observation: All those lightweight runs were successful.
45697756



































CT 4 verify:_[?][3f]__[M-h][e8]__[M-’][a7]__[‘][60]__[ ][20]__[M-A][c1]_





































































































































































CT 4 verify:_[)][29]__[B][42]__[M-^X][98]__[^?][7f]__[M-^A][81]__[ ][20]_
















































































































Lead at t=1 core=1, m=0, key1stB_q_
Orig PT:_[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]_











































CT 4 verify:_[n][6e]__[ ][20]__[5][35]__[M->][be]__[M-e][e5]__[M-R][d2]_










































































































































Job ID (45697777 45697776 45697775 45697774 45697773 45697772 45697771 45697770
45697769 45697768 45697747 45697746 45697745 45697744 45697743 45697742 45697741
45697739 45697740 45697738 45697717 45697715 45697716 45697714 45697713 45697712
45697711 45697710 45697709 45697708 45697686 45697687 45697685 45697684 45697683
45697682 45697680 45697681 45697679 45697678)
The number of booked cores is 32 (1 Parent and 31 children)
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (Multiple) and it is used as the start point of the first
chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1024) the chain end point becomes
: (Multiple)
Ciphertext Challenge: (Multiple)
CT decrypts back to: (Multiple)
output log:






















Observation: All runs were successful.
45697777







































































































































































































































































CT 4 verify:_[7][37]__[t][74]__[^[][1b]__[M- ][a0]__[M-^E][85]__[U][55]_





















































































































Lead at t=1 core=1, m=0, key1stB_d_
Orig PT:_[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]__[P][50]__[T][54]_


































































































CT 4 verify:_[M-o][ef]__[H][48]__[ ][09]__[:][3a]__[M-c][e3]__[%][25]_






























































Figure A.1: Relating density of output to job elapsed time in seconds
A.2.2 Decreasing output density
The output to file, like network and other IO, is handled by MPI. It was important to
execute runs that are not output dense and compare the results.
Figure A.1 Plot cross reference between MperC Char/Byte Density of output and
elapsed time in seconds.
Job ID: 45941096 45941097 45941098 45941099 45941100 45941101 45941102
45941103 45941104 45941105 45941106 45941107 45941109 45941110 45941111
45941112 45941113 45941114 45941115 45941116
The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (multiple - details below) and it is used as the start point
of the first chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (4096) the chain end point becomes
: (multiple - details below)
Ciphertext Challenge: (multiple - details below)
CT decrypts back to: (multiple - details below)
168
output log: (multiple)





















Observation: Some jobs were successful and some were not. Regardless of how much wall-
time was asked, the jobs that had T=4096, C=1024, and M=1,072,693,248 finished in
around 01:16:20 hours.
Some jobs that had T=4096, C=1024, and M=2,145,386,496 Stopped after about
04:00:00 hours as the GPC killed the jobs for going over the time. This can be justified as M
is twice the size. Looking at the output file (Ex: LowD4096t1024c2145386496m4hrsbestCvrg0.o45941114),
the time expires while the child processes are generating the starting point. This sample
will be used to decrease the the test density further more and remeasure results.
Some jobs that had T=4096, C=1024, and M=2,145,386,496 Stopped after about
02:31:00 hours. It is not clear why they stopped but they stop around the same place
as the other failed jobs. That is, after generating 2097152 LFSR for starting points.
169
Next action: Decrease output density further more. With 1024 cores we are allowed 16
hours. Queue jobs for M=1,072,693,248 under these condition.
LowD4096t1024c1072693248m4hrs_bestCvrg0.o45941096
45941096















































































































































































































The whole batch where m= 2,145,386,496 records and W = 4:00:00 hours ran out of
time.
for j in 45941137 45941136 45941135 45941134 45941133 45941132 45941131
45941130 45941129 45941128 45941127 45941125 45941124 45941123 45941122
45941121 45941120 45941119 45941118 45941117 ; do ls *.o${j} ; echo $j
; cat -v *.[oe]$j* | egrep "Verification|walltime|ERR" ; echo "" ; done
| sed -e "s/\t\t/\t/" | sed -e "s/Orig/\nOrig/g" | sed -e "s/Found/\
nFound/" | sed -e "s/Recovered/\nRecovered/" | sed -e "s/Yaaaay l/L/" |
sed -e "s/Chain/\nChain/" | sed -e "s/CT 4 verify/\nCT 4 verify/" |
sed -e "s/Yaaaay: /\n/"
LowD1048576t1024c2145386496m4hrs_bestCvrg7.o45941137
45941137




























































And so did the batch were m=1,072,693,248 records and W=4:00:00 hours.
LowD1048576t1024c1072693248m4hrs_bestCvrg3.o45941127
45941127




























































A.2.3 Decreasing output density further
We attempted to radically decrease the debug information especially for the Child pro-
cesses. Job ID 46040582 46040583 46040584 46040585
The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (multiple) and it is used as the start point of the first
chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1048576 = 2^20, ) the chain end
point becomes : (multiple)
Ciphertext Challenge: (multiple)
CT decrypts back to: (multiple)
output log: (multiple)






















Observation: Runs that had t= 1048576 = 220 iterations, and M= 1,072,693,248 = 230
records ran out of time (4 hours walltime).
VLowD 1048576t 1024c 1072693248m 4hrs_bestCvrg3.o46040582
46040582




VLowD 1048576t 1024c 1072693248m 4hrs_bestCvrg3.o46040583
46040583




VLowD 1048576t 1024c 1072693248m 4hrs_bestCvrg3.o46040584
46040584




VLowD 1048576t 1024c 1072693248m 4hrs_bestCvrg3.o46040585
46040585




Job ID 46040586 46040587 46040588 46040589
The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
181
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (multiple) and it is used as the start point of the first
chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1048576 = 2^20, ) the chain end
point becomes : (multiple)
Ciphertext Challenge: (multiple)
CT decrypts back to: (multiple)
output log: (multiple)










M= M= 2,145,386,496 = 2^31 records
C= 1024
W= 4 hours








Observation: So did fail the runs that had t= 1048576 = 220 iterations, and M= 2,145,386,496
= 231 records.
VLowD 1048576t 1024c 2145386496m 4hrs_bestCvrg7.o46040586
46040586





VLowD 1048576t 1024c 2145386496m 4hrs_bestCvrg7.o46040587
46040587




VLowD 1048576t 1024c 2145386496m 4hrs_bestCvrg7.o46040588
46040588




VLowD 1048576t 1024c 2145386496m 4hrs_bestCvrg7.o46040589
46040589




Job ID 46040598 46040599
The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (multiple) and it is used as the start point of the first
chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1048576 = 2^20, ) the chain end
point becomes : (multiple)
Ciphertext Challenge: (multiple)
CT decrypts back to: (multiple)
output log: (multiple)











M= M= 1,072,693,248 = 2^30 records
C= 1024
W= 4 hours








Observation: Some 8 hours run also ran out of time even with a smaller m of 1,072,693,248
records.
VLowD 1048576t 1024c 1072693248m 8hrs_bestCvrg3.o46040598
46040598




VLowD 1048576t 1024c 1072693248m 8hrs_bestCvrg3.o46040599
46040599






The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (multiple) and it is used as the start point of the first
chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (4096 = 2^12, ) the chain end point
becomes : (multiple)
Ciphertext Challenge: (multiple)
CT decrypts back to: (multiple)
output log: (multiple)










M= 1,072,693,248 = 2^30 records
C= 1024
W= 4 hours








Observation: With 4096 T, 4 hours run were mostly successful. Job 46040572 finished in
1 hour 11 minutes, found the Key but also found 5 false positive leads. Two of the keys
were 0x6cc94a0fb8fe, Two were 0x3173e31408b3, One was 0xcb59825b9174. Those false
positives were in 5 different chains and 2 pairs are of the same values. This shows that
there is collision between chains.












CT 4 verify:_[ ][20]__[M-d][e4]__[P][50]__[M-^^][9e]__[M-Z][da]__[D][44]_








CT 4 verify:_[ ][20]__[M-d][e4]__[P][50]__[M-^^][9e]__[M-Z][da]__[D][44]_










































The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (multiple) and it is used as the start point of the first
chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1048576 = 2^20, ) the chain end
point becomes : (multiple)
187
Ciphertext Challenge: (multiple)
CT decrypts back to: (multiple)
output log: (multiple)










M= 1,072,693,248 = 2^30 records
C= 1024
W= 4 hours








Observation: With the same 4096 T, 4 hours, job 46040573 also finished in about 1 hour
11 minutes, found the Key, and also found 9 false positive leads. Six of the false positives
were all 0xcc192590b40f which means a high level of collision. There is currently no way
to tell exactly what is the percentage of the collision because we do not record it. We only
record those that flagged as potential lead and by definition they are a small percentage.
So we can derive that the overall collision is equal to or larger than the lead collision. The
three other false alarms are unique.
VLowD 4096t 1024c 1072693248m 4hrs_bestCvrg0.o46040573
46040573






















































































We have Verification also.













The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (multiple) and it is used as the start point of the first
chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1048576 = 2^20, ) the chain end
point becomes : (multiple)
Ciphertext Challenge: (multiple)
191
CT decrypts back to: (multiple)
output log: (multiple)










M= 1,072,693,248 = 2^30 records
C= 1024
W= 4 hours








Observation:Job 46040574 was successful without false positive leads.
VLowD 4096t 1024c 1072693248m 4hrs_bestCvrg0.o46040574
46040574
















The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (multiple) and it is used as the start point of the first
chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1048576 = 2^20, ) the chain end
point becomes : (multiple)
Ciphertext Challenge: (multiple)
CT decrypts back to: (multiple)
output log: (multiple)










M= 1,072,693,248 = 2^30 records
C= 1024
W= 4 hours









Observation: Job 46040575 found the Key but also found 3 false positive leads. The three
false positive leads are unique.
VLowD4096t1024c1072693248m4hrs_bestCvrg0.o46040575
46040575











































The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (multiple) and it is used as the start point of the first
chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1048576 = 2^20, ) the chain end
point becomes : (multiple)
Ciphertext Challenge: (multiple)
CT decrypts back to: (multiple)
output log: (multiple)






















Observation: Job 46040590 found the Key but also found 9 false positive leads. Two
pairs had the same values: 0x031cfabd2efd and 0xb8e6f7103b14, one value was lost in the
extraction but is recoverable, and the4 had unique values.
VLowD4096t1024c1072693248m8hrs_bestCvrg0.o46040590
46040590























[Record truncated due to special characters.]









































































The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (multiple) and it is used as the start point of the first
chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1048576 = 2^20, ) the chain end
point becomes : (multiple)
Ciphertext Challenge: (multiple)
CT decrypts back to: (multiple)
output log: (multiple)










M= 1,072,693,248 = 2^30 records
C= 1024
W= 4 hours









Observation: Job 46040591 found the Key but also found 18 false positive leads. One false
positive value (0xc715ed95a111) repeats 6 times in 6 different chains. One repeats 3 times,
and two repeats twice. five more are unique. Since this is a significantly larger set of false
positives we can compare t, c, and m to see if there is any relations. Figure A.2 shows
that only one value repeats c=42 which means that core 42 yielded 2 false positives at 2
different chains in the same table, chain 1026006 and chain 1639710. Each happened at a
different iteration t, respectively, t=599, and t=1861.
Figure A.2: False positive plot for job 46040591
VLowD4096t1024c1072693248m8hrs_bestCvrg0.o46040591
46040591






[String truncated while extracting]









CT 4 verify:_[M-8][b8]__[(][28]__[^E][05]__[%][25]__[M- ][a0]__[C][43]_








CT 4 verify:_[M-8][b8]__[(][28]__[^E][05]__[%][25]__[M- ][a0]__[C][43]_








CT 4 verify:_[M-8][b8]__[(][28]__[^E][05]__[%][25]__[M- ][a0]__[C][43]_








CT 4 verify:_[M-8][b8]__[(][28]__[^E][05]__[%][25]__[M- ][a0]__[C][43]_
201







































CT 4 verify:_[M-8][b8]__[(][28]__[^E][05]__[%][25]__[M- ][a0]__[C][43]_






















































































We have Verification also.















The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (multiple) and it is used as the start point of the first
chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1048576 = 2^20, ) the chain end
point becomes : (multiple)
Ciphertext Challenge: (multiple)
CT decrypts back to: (multiple)
output log: (multiple)










M= 1,072,693,248 = 2^30 records
C= 1024
W= 4 hours








Observation: Job 46040592 found the Key but also found 16 false positive leads. One false
positive value (0x356d35bca3ef) repeats 12 times in 12 different chains. The remaining 4
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false positives are unique. This is also a significantly large set of false positives. We can
compare t, c, and m to see if there is any relations. Figure A.3 shows that there is no
overlap.
Figure A.3: False positive plot for job 46040592
VLowD4096t1024c1072693248m8hrs_bestCvrg0.o46040592
46040592






[Record truncated due to special characters.]








































































































































































The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (multiple) and it is used as the start point of the first
chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1048576 = 2^20, ) the chain end
point becomes : (multiple)
Ciphertext Challenge: (multiple)
CT decrypts back to: (multiple)
output log: (multiple)











M= 1,072,693,248 = 2^30 records
C= 1024
W= 4 hours








Observation: Job 46040593 found the Key but also found 7 false positive leads. 3 unique
and two pairs with the same values. They all occurred at different t,c, and m.
VLowD4096t1024c1072693248m8hrs_bestCvrg0.o46040593
46040593













































































Job ID 46040577 46040579 46040581 46040594 46040595 46040596 46040597
The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
215
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (multiple) and it is used as the start point of the first
chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1048576 = 2^20, ) the chain end
point becomes : (multiple)
Ciphertext Challenge: (multiple)
CT decrypts back to: (multiple)
output log: (multiple)










M= 2,145,386,496 = 2^31 records
C= 1024
W= 4 hours








Observation: These set of jobs finished without finding the key, exhausting the walltime
or issuing an error. Memory limits are assumed to be good since initializing the SP was fine.
Looking at the allocated memory, it is about 227gb if we take the median 238314532kb.





































A.2.4 Changing the algorithm
On of the objectives of the research was to compare similar runs in terms of key variables
using different but comparable encryption algorithms. Since Simeck is very similar to
Speck it was the obvious choice. Job ID: 46336986 (46336988 46336987 46336985 did not
succeed)
The number of booked cores is 1024 (1 Parent and 1023 children)
plaintext is: PTPTPT
Random key: (multiple) and it is used as the start point of the first
chain.
After encrypting the plaintext T times (1048576 = 2^20, ) the chain end
point becomes : (multiple)
Ciphertext Challenge: (multiple)
CT decrypts back to: (multiple)
output log: (multiple)










M= 1,072,693,248 = 2^30 records
C= 1024
W= 4 hours

















We have Verification also.
ctime = Thu Dec 21 09:46:56 2017
mtime = Thu Dec 21 09:46:56 2017
qtime = Thu Dec 21 09:46:56 2017
Resource_List.walltime = 04:00:00
etime = Thu Dec 21 09:46:56 2017
Observation: Four tests were run using Speck and only one of them succeeded in retrieving
the verification key. The rate of false positives was very high comparing to Simeck which
lead to higher output density and the inability to compare run times.
A.2.5 Measuring the effect of sort
The complexity of sorting algorithms have a significant penalty on the runs that are not
particularly useful in this phase of the research as it entails comparing many runs. However,
it was also important to sample some runs with sorting enabled to draw a comparison. The
following jobs are comparable to jobs that had high output density for Simeck. The general
observation from those jobs that work that used to take a less than two hours , now needs
more than 8 hours. Indeed the program gets kicked out by GPC while sorting.
45940946
























































































































































































































































# load modules (must match modules used for compilation)
module load intel/15.0.2 openmpi/intel/1.6.4
# DIRECTORY TO RUN - $PBS_O_WORKDIR is directory job was submitted from
cd $PBS_O_WORKDIR
# EXECUTION COMMAND; -np = nodes*ppn
mpirun -np 2048 ./tmt.out
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B.2 Shell code used to run a range of permutations
(multiple sizes and main variables)
48_tmt_test.sh
# Pushing M
# records per core = 2 GB / (2 records * 32BS/8 ) - overhead = 2 1024 1024
1024 / 8 = 512 M record pre core = 500 million recorde per core. 300
million if 48bit
# we are now at 1 million. we need to test 1 to 500 million records per
core
# eventually for BS48 we can atim for 2^28 = 268435456 = less than 300
million record = 2,147,483,648 bytes
# Pushing C
# Without special permission i’m allowed to submit #PBS -l nodes=256:ppn
=8,walltime=48:00:00 which means maximum of 2048 cores
# we should test 15 30 45 60 2 3 4 ... 48 . righ now we can keep it at 30
minute
# Pushing T though W (walltime)
# without special permission i’m allowed to submit request for 48 hours
# now, 15 minutes is barely enough for t=1024 and m=1024*1024. 15*60=
900=~ 1024. We can assume seconds of walltime = t*m / 1024
# 48 hr* 60min * 60 sec = 172800 (2^17 131072).... 900sec make 1G m*t ~~~





for w in 4 ; do # maximum time in batchmode is 48... 04 08 16 24 32 40 48;
do # should be in hours ‘seq 1 48‘ # 2^10?
for c in 1024;do #1024 2048; do # 2048 # 2^11 Cores stop
working on 1024, 832 ran out of walltime but essentially fine
for t in 4096 1048576; do # it seems 2^20 1048576 works ###48bit 204857
worked, but 304857 didnt find the winner... # can we get to 2^18
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204857
for f in 1 2 ;do # 2 4; do # 2^8 #128 and above runs out
of memory, 8 gets An error occurred in MPI_Type_vector, 2 is fine
, 4 exceeds 1hour
m=‘expr $(expr $f) \* 1024 \* 1024 \* $( expr $c - 1 )‘ ; # 2^20
mt=‘expr $m \* $t / $z‘;
echo "Walltime=$w , Cores+1=$c , T=$t , mFactor= $f , Total M for
all Cores= $m .... Key space= $z , Best case Coverage $mt....
NoSort=${s}" ;
for test in ‘seq 1 10‘; do
KEY=$(cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc ’a-zA-Z0-9’ | fold -w 6 | head -n
1 ) ;
##KEY="KCKCKC";
KEYHEX=$(for i in ‘echo $KEY | sed -e ’s/\(.\)/\1\n/g’ ‘ ; do
printf ’%02x’ "’$i" ; done | grep "");
PTEXT=$(cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc ’a-zA-Z0-9’ | fold -w 6 | head




./tmt_create.sh -M ${m} -C ${c} -W ${w} -T ${t} -B 48 -E 2 -H 0 -L 0 -
S 1 -R GPC -K $KEY -X $KEYHEX -P PTPTPT -n IncT${t}t${c}c${m}m${w}
hrs_bestCvrg${mt} ;
echo ./tmt_create.sh -M ${m} -C ${c} -W ${w} -T ${t} -B 48 -E 2 -H 0 -L 0








B.3 Shell code used to collect data from runs and






echo "Comment; M; C; W; T; B; E; H; L; S; R; N; Winners; resources; limits
; error; leads; verifications; MAXCOV; Clog2; Mlog2; Tlog2; resources;
cput; mem; vmem; walltime1; limits; neednodes; ppn1; nodes; ppn2;
walltime2; outputDensityLines; outputDensityChars; o_file; e_file;




for cfile in ‘ls -t ./tmt_*${TAG}*.c| head -900 ‘; do
fn=‘expr $fn + 1‘; echo " "; echo " "; echo " "; echo " ";





if [ -a ${HOME}/${ofile} ]
then
printf "1>>>> object file exists:\n ${HOME}/${ofile} \n";
else




if [ -a ${HOME}/${sfile} ]
then
printf "2>>>> shell file exists:\n ${HOME}/${sfile} \n";
else
230





if [ -a ${HOME}/${lfile} ]
then
printf "3>>>> job log file exists:\n ${HOME}/${lfile} \n";
else





if [ -a ${SCRATCH}/${wfile} ]
then
printf "4>>>> Winner file exists:\n ${SCRATCH}/${wfile} \n";














notes=‘echo $cfile | gawk -F’__notes=’ ’{ print $2; } ’ | sed -e ’s/\.c$
//’ ‘
jobid=‘echo $lfile | gawk -F’_bestCvrg’ ’{ print $2; } ’ | sed -e ’s/\.
gpc.*$//’ | sed -e ’s/.*_//’‘
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printf ">>>> Notes are: $notes \n
....................................................... \n JObID is:
$jobid \n................................................... \n";
# ls ${notes}.o${jobid} ;
# ls $SCRATCH/${notes}.o${jobid} ;





if [ -e ${o_file} ]
then
printf "5>>>> output file exists:\n ${o_file} \n";
resources=‘cat -v ${o_file}| grep Resources‘
#https://stackoverflow.com/questions/10520623/how-to-split-one-string-
into-multiple-variables-in-bash-shell
cput=$(echo $resources | cut -f1 -d, |cut -f2 -d=)
mem=$(echo $resources | cut -f2 -d, | cut -f2 -d= | cut -f1 -dk)
vmem=$(echo $resources | cut -f3 -d, | cut -f2 -d= | cut -f1 -dk)






limits=‘cat -v ${o_file}| grep Limits ‘
neednodes=$(echo $limits | cut -f1 -d, |cut -f2 -d: |cut -f2 -d=)
ppn1=$(echo $limits | cut -f1 -d, |cut -f3 -d: |cut -f2 -d=)
nodes=$(echo $limits | cut -f2 -d, |cut -f1 -d: |cut -f2 -d=)
ppn2=$(echo $limits | cut -f2 -d, |cut -f2 -d: |cut -f2 -d=)








outputDensityLines=‘wc -l < ${o_file}‘
outputDensityChars=‘wc -c < ${o_file}‘
leads=‘cat -v ${o_file}| grep Yaaaay | wc -l‘
verified=‘cat -v ${o_file}| grep Verification | head -1‘
verifications=‘cat -v ${o_file}| grep Verification | wc -l‘
grepper=‘cat -v ${o_file}| grep GREPME ‘
#resources=‘grep Resources ${o_file}‘
#limits=‘grep Limits ${o_file}‘
#leads=‘grep Yaaaay ${o_file} | wc -l‘
#verified=‘grep Verification ${o_file}| head -1‘
#verifications=‘grep Verification ${o_file}| wc -l‘
#grepper=‘grep GREPME ${o_file}‘
elif [ -e ${o_file2} ]
then
#o_file=‘echo ${o_file2}‘
printf "5,>>>> output file exists:\n ${o_file} \n";
resources=‘cat -v ${o_file}| grep Resources‘
cput=$(echo $resources | cut -f1 -d, |cut -f2 -d=)
mem=$(echo $resources | cut -f2 -d, | cut -f2 -d= | cut -f1 -dk)
vmem=$(echo $resources | cut -f3 -d, | cut -f2 -d= | cut -f1 -dk)






limits=‘cat -v ${o_file}| grep Limits ‘
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neednodes=$(echo $limits | cut -f1 -d, |cut -f2 -d: |cut -f2 -d=)
ppn1=$(echo $limits | cut -f1 -d, |cut -f3 -d: |cut -f2 -d=)
nodes=$(echo $limits | cut -f2 -d, |cut -f1 -d: |cut -f2 -d=)
ppn2=$(echo $limits | cut -f2 -d, |cut -f2 -d: |cut -f2 -d=)







outputDensityLines=‘wc -l < ${o_file}‘
outputDensityChars=‘wc -c < ${o_file}‘
leads=‘cat -v ${o_file}| grep Yaaaay | wc -l‘
verified=‘cat -v ${o_file}| grep Verification | head -1‘
verifications=‘cat -v ${o_file}| grep Verification | wc -l‘
grepper=‘cat -v ${o_file}| grep GREPME ‘
# resources=‘grep Resources ${o_file}‘
# limits=‘grep Limits ${o_file}‘
# leads=‘grep Yaaaay ${o_file} | wc -l‘
# verified=‘grep Verification ${o_file}| head -1‘
# verifications=‘grep Verification ${o_file}| wc -l‘
# grepper=‘grep GREPME ${o_file}‘
else








if [ -e ${e_file} ]
then
echo "6>>>> error file exists: ${e_file} ";
wc -l ${e_file};
error=‘grep ERR_ ${e_file} | sed -e ’s/.*\*//’‘
#####if error=="" then error="unclear" .. wrong grep
else





for i in $(echo $cfile | tr "_" "\n" | tr "=" "\n")
do
count=‘expr $count + 1‘;
#echo -n $count $i;




if [ $count -eq ’13’ ]; then
C=$i;
echo " C=’$C’";
Cl2=‘echo "l($C)/l(2)" | bc -l‘ ;
Clog2=‘echo ${Cl2%.*}‘
MperC=‘expr $(expr $M) / $(expr $C - 1 ) ‘;
Ml2=‘echo "l($MperC)/l(2)" | bc -l‘ ;
Mlog2=‘echo ${Ml2%.*}‘
fi
if [ $count -eq ’15’ ]; then
W=${i};
echo " W=’$W’ ";
fi
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if [ $count -eq ’16’ ]; then
W=${W}:${i};
echo " W=’$W’ ";
fi




if [ $count -eq ’19’ ]; then
T=$i;
echo " T=’$T’";
Tl2=‘echo "l($T)/l(2)" | bc -l‘ ;
Tlog2=‘echo ${Tl2%.*}‘
MAXCOV=$(( $Clog2 + Tlog2 + Mlog2))
fi
































echo " Err=${error} "
echo " Res=${resources}"
echo " Lim=${limits}"









# echo "${notes}; ${M}; ${C}; ${W}; ${T}; ${B}; ${E}; ${H}; ${L}; ${S}; $
{R}; ${N}; ${winners}; ${resources}; ${limits}; ${error}; ${leads}; ${
verifications}; ${verified}; ${o_file}; ${e_file}; ${cfile}; ${ofile};
${sfile}; ${lfile}; ${wfile};" >> tmt_results_table.csv
## echo "${notes}; ${M}; ${C}; ${W}; ${T}; ${B}; ${E}; ${H}; ${L}; ${S}; $
{R}; ${N}; ${winners}; ${resources}; ${limits}; ${error}; ${leads}; ${
verifications}; ${verified}; ${MAXCOV}; ${Clog2}; ${Mlog2}; ${Tlog2}; $
{grepper}"
echo "${notes}; ${M}; ${C}; ${W}; ${T}; ${B}; ${E}; ${H}; ${L}; ${S}; ${R
}; ${N}; ${winners}; ${resources}; ${limits}; ${error}; ${leads}; ${
verifications}; ${MAXCOV}; ${Clog2}; ${Mlog2}; ${Tlog2}; $resources;
$cput; $mem; $vmem; $walltime1; $limits; $neednodes; $ppn1; $nodes;
$ppn2; $walltime2; $outputDensityLines; $outputDensityChars; ${o_file
}; ${e_file}; ${cfile}; ${ofile}; ${sfile}; ${lfile}; ${wfile}; ${
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grepper}; ${verified}" >> tmt_results_table_${TAG}.csv
echo "${notes}; ${M}; ${C}; ${W}; ${T}; ${B}; ${E}; ${H}; ${L}; ${S}; ${
R}; ${N}; ${winners}; ${resources}; ${limits}; ${error}; ${leads}; ${
verifications}; ${MAXCOV}; ${Clog2}; ${Mlog2}; ${Tlog2}; $resources;
$cput; $mem; $vmem; $walltime1; $limits; $neednodes; $ppn1; $nodes;
$ppn2; $walltime2; $outputDensityLines; $outputDensityChars; ${o_file
}; ${e_file}; ${cfile}; ${ofile}; ${sfile}; ${lfile}; ${wfile}; ${
grepper}; ${verified};"
echo XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXxx
## echo "{notes}; {M}; {C}; {W}; {T}; {B}; {E}; {H}; {L}; {S}; {R}; {N}; {
winners}; {resources}; {limits}; {error}; {leads}; {verifications}; {
verified}; {MAXCOV}; {Clog2}; {Mlog2}; {Tlog2}; {grepper}"
#echo "${notes}; ${M}; ${C}; ${W}; ${T}; ${B}; ${E}; ${H}; ${L}; ${S}; $






## c file, sh file, obj file, joblog file, e file, o file, win file
B.4 Other useful shell information and commands
- Show the list and status of queued, running, or freshly cancelled jobs:
qstat -u user <username>







C.1 The main time-memory trade-off C program
tmt.c
/*
* module load intel/15.0.2
* icc hw.c -lssl -lcrypto
* ./a.out
* clear; fn=tmt07; rm *.log ; rm ./$fn.out; module load intel/15.0.2
openmpi/intel/1.6.4; mpicc $fn.c -o $fn.out -lssl -lcrypto; date;
mpirun -np 121 $fn.out ; date
*





* gpc-f102n004-ib0-$ clear; fn=tmt17; rm *.log ; rm ./$fn.out; module
load intel/15.0.2 openmpi/intel/1.6.4; mpicc $fn.c -o $fn.out -lssl -




















/*User must manually define those parameters*/
#define Total_M 780000 //65536+overhead 2^16
#define T 4
#define CipherUnderAttack 0 //XOR


















Encrypt (unsigned char *Key, unsigned char *Msg, int size, unsigned char *
Res)
{




int n = 0;
DES_cblock Key2;
DES_key_schedule schedule;
////--Res = (char *) malloc (size);
/* Prepare the key for use with DES_cfb64_encrypt */
memcpy (Key2, Key, 8);
DES_set_odd_parity (&Key2);
DES_set_key_checked (&Key2, &schedule);
/* Encryption occurs here */
DES_cfb64_encrypt ((unsigned char *) Msg, (unsigned char *) Res,
size, &schedule, &Key2, &n, DES_ENCRYPT);
return (Res);
}





int i, string_length = size; //strlen(Msg);
////--static char *Res;
////--Res = (char *) malloc (string_length);
for (i = 0; i < string_length; i++)
{
Res[i] = Msg[i] ^ Key[i];






else if (CipherUnderAttack == 2) /*SIMECK */
{
if (size == 6){
uint32_t PTi[] = {0,0,};
uint32_t KYi[] = {0,0,0,0,};
uint32_t CTi[] = {0,0,};
PTi[0] = ( Msg[2] << 16 ) + ( Msg[1] <<8 ) + ( Msg[0]);
PTi[1] = ( Msg[5] << 16 ) + ( Msg[4] <<8 ) + ( Msg[3]);
KYi[0] = ( Key[2] << 16 ) + ( Key[1] <<8 ) + ( Key[0]);
KYi[1] = ( Key[5] << 16 ) + ( Key[4] <<8 ) + ( Key[3]);
//KYi[2] = ( KYc[8] << 16 ) + ( KYc[7] <<8 ) + ( KYc[6]);
//KYi[3] = ( KYc[11] << 16 ) + ( KYc[10] <<8 ) + ( KYc[9]);
simeck_48_96(KYi, PTi, CTi);
Res[2] = CTi[0] >> 16 ;
Res[1] = CTi[0] >> 8 ;
Res[0] = CTi[0] & 0xFFFF;
Res[5] = CTi[1] >> 16 ;
Res[4] = CTi[1] >> 8 ;
Res[3] = CTi[1] & 0xFFFF;
/*
if (debug==2) printf ("sillybilly=== inKey is:::");
char * verifyCTCptrx = Key ; int sillycounterx=0;





uint32_t * ResInt = calloc(2, sizeof(uint32_t));
uint32_t * KeyInt = calloc(2, sizeof(uint32_t));
uint32_t * MsgInt = calloc(2, sizeof(uint32_t));
memcpy (KeyInt, Key, (size ));
memcpy (MsgInt, Msg, (size) );
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simeck_48_96 (KeyInt, MsgInt, ResInt);
memcpy (Res, ResInt, (size) );
*/
/* uint32_t Res_integered[] = { 0, 0, };
uint32_t Key_integered[] = { 0, 0, };
Key_integered[0] = (Key[2] << 16) + (Key[1] << 8) + Key[0];
Key_integered[1] = (Key[5] << 16) + (Key[4] << 8) + Key[3];
uint32_t Msg_integered[] = { 0, 0, };
Msg_integered[0] = (Msg[2] << 16) + (Msg[1] << 8) + Msg[0];
Msg_integered[1] = (Msg[5] << 16) + (Msg[4] << 8) + Msg[3];
simeck_48_96 (Key_integered, Msg_integered, Res_integered);
Res[0] = Res_integered[0] & 0xFF;
Res[1] = Res_integered[0] >> 8;
Res[2] = Res_integered[0] >> 16;
Res[3] = Res_integered[1] & 0xFF;
Res[4] = Res_integered[1] >> 8;
Res[5] = Res_integered[1] >> 16;
if (debug==2) printf (" === ct is:");
verifyCTCptrx = Res_integered ; // warning #556: a value of type "
uint32_t={unsigned int} *" cannot be assigned to an entity of
type "char *"
if (debug==2) for (sillycounterx=0; sillycounterx<size; sillycounterx
++){ printf("[%d_%02x]",sillycounterx, *verifyCTCptrx);
verifyCTCptrx++;}
if (debug==2) printf (" === PT is:"); // warning #556: a value of
type "uint32_t={unsigned int} *" cannot be assigned to an entity
of type "char *"
verifyCTCptrx = Msg_integered;





if (debug==2) printf("sillybilly ENC ResInt: %08x %08x \t KeyInt: %08





} else if (size == 4){
////--static char *Res;
////--Res = (char *) malloc (size);




Key_integered[0] = (Key[1] << 8) + Key[0];
Key_integered[1] = (Key[3] << 8) + Key[2];
/*Key_integered[2] = (Key[5] << 8) + Key[4];
Key_integered[3] = (Key[7] << 8) + Key[6];
*/
uint16_t Msg_integered[2];
Msg_integered[0] = (Msg[1] << 8) + Msg[0];
Msg_integered[1] = (Msg[3] << 8) + Msg[2];
/* simeck_32_64(key64, text32, CT32); */
/*simeck_32_64_Dec(key64_Dec, CT32, PT32_Dec); */
//simeck_32_32 (Key_integered, Msg_integered, Res_integered);
simeck_32_64 (Key_integered, Msg_integered, Res_integered);
/* simeck_32_32_Dec(key32_32_Dec, CT32, PT32_Dec); */
/* simeck_32_64(Key_integered, Msg_integered, Res_integered); */
/* http://stackoverflow.com/questions/13279024/convert-a-uint16-t-to-
char2-to-be-sent-over-socket-unix */
Res[0] = Res_integered[0] & 0xFF;
Res[1] = Res_integered[0] >> 8;
Res[2] = Res_integered[1] & 0xFF;









Decrypt (unsigned char *Key, unsigned char *Msg, int size, unsigned char *
Res)
{
if (CipherUnderAttack == 1)
{
/*DES*/ static char *Res;
int n = 0;
DES_cblock Key2;
DES_key_schedule schedule;
Res = (char *) malloc (size);
/* Prepare the key for use with DES_cfb64_encrypt */
memcpy (Key2, Key, 8);
DES_set_odd_parity (&Key2);
DES_set_key_checked (&Key2, &schedule);
/* Decryption occurs here */
DES_cfb64_encrypt ((unsigned char *) Msg, (unsigned char *) Res,
size, &schedule, &Key2, &n, DES_DECRYPT);
return (Res);
}





int i, string_length = size; //strlen(Msg);
static char *Res;
Res = (char *) malloc (string_length);
for (i = 0; i < string_length; i++)
{
Res[i] = Msg[i] ^ Key[i];
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else if (CipherUnderAttack == 2)
{ /*Simeck */
if (size == 4){
//static char *Res;
uint16_t Res_integered[] = { 0, 0, };




Key_integered[0] = (Key[1] << 8) + Key[0];
Key_integered[1] = (Key[3] << 8) + Key[2];
uint16_t Msg_integered[2];
Msg_integered[0] = (Msg[1] << 8) + Msg[0];
Msg_integered[1] = (Msg[3] << 8) + Msg[2];
//simeck_32_32_Dec (Key_integered, Msg_integered, Res_integered);
simeck_32_64_Dec (Key_integered, Msg_integered, Res_integered);
/* http://stackoverflow.com/questions/13279024/convert-a-uint16-t-to-
char2-to-be-sent-over-socket-unix */
Res[0] = Res_integered[0] & 0xFF;
Res[1] = Res_integered[0] >> 8;
Res[2] = Res_integered[1] & 0xFF;
Res[3] = Res_integered[1] >> 8;
return (Res);
//free (Res);
} else if (size == 6){
uint32_t RTi[] = {0,0,};
//uint32_t PTi[] = {0,0,};
uint32_t KYi[] = {0,0,0,0,};
uint32_t CTi[] = {0,0,};
CTi[0] = ( Msg[2] << 16 ) + ( Msg[1] <<8 ) + ( Msg[0]);
CTi[1] = ( Msg[5] << 16 ) + ( Msg[4] <<8 ) + ( Msg[3]);
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KYi[0] = ( Key[2] << 16 ) + ( Key[1] <<8 ) + ( Key[0]);
KYi[1] = ( Key[5] << 16 ) + ( Key[4] <<8 ) + ( Key[3]);
//KYi[2] = ( KYc[8] << 16 ) + ( KYc[7] <<8 ) + ( KYc[6]);
//KYi[3] = ( KYc[11] << 16 ) + ( KYc[10] <<8 ) + ( KYc[9]);
simeck_48_96_Dec(KYi, CTi, RTi);
Res[2] = RTi[0] >> 16 ;
Res[1] = RTi[0] >> 8 ;
Res[0] = RTi[0] & 0xFFFF;
Res[5] = RTi[1] >> 16 ;
Res[4] = RTi[1] >> 8 ;
Res[3] = RTi[1] & 0xFFFF;
/*
uint32_t * ResInt = calloc(2, sizeof(uint32_t));
uint32_t * KeyInt = calloc(2, sizeof(uint32_t));
uint32_t * MsgInt = calloc(2, sizeof(uint32_t));
memcpy (KeyInt, Key, (size)) ;
memcpy (MsgInt, Msg, (size)) ;
simeck_48_96_Dec (KeyInt, MsgInt, ResInt);
memcpy (Res, ResInt, (size) );
printf("sillybilly Key: %08x %08x \t KeyInt: %08x %08x \n", Key[0],
Key[1], KeyInt[0], KeyInt[1] );
*/
/*
uint32_t Res_integered[] = { 0, 0, };
uint32_t Key_integered[] = { 0, 0, };
Key_integered[0] = (Key[2] << 16) + (Key[1] << 8) + Key[0];
Key_integered[1] = (Key[5] << 16) + (Key[4] << 8) + Key[3];
uint32_t Msg_integered[] = { 0, 0, };
Msg_integered[0] = (Msg[2] << 16) + (Msg[1] << 8) + Msg[0];
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Msg_integered[1] = (Msg[5] << 16) + (Msg[4] << 8) + Msg[3];
simeck_48_96_Dec (Key_integered, Msg_integered, Res_integered);
Res[0] = Res_integered[0] & 0xFF;
Res[1] = Res_integered[0] >> 8;
Res[2] = Res_integered[0] >> 16;
Res[3] = Res_integered[1] & 0xFF;
Res[4] = Res_integered[1] >> 8;
Res[5] = Res_integered[1] >> 16;
if (debug==2) printf("sillybilly DEC MsgInt : %08x %08x \t KeyInt:
%08x %08x Recovered:: %08x %08x \n", Msg_integered[0],









CalculateEndPoint (unsigned char *SPp, unsigned char *EPp, int BS, int
record, int taskid,
double BruteForceNumberOfComputations, double M,
double WallTime, int TT)
{
int t = 0;
unsigned char *CipherT;
CipherT = calloc (BS, sizeof (char));
unsigned char *key;
key = malloc (BS);
memcpy (key, SPp, BS);
for (t = 0; t < TT; t++)
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{if (debug==3) { printf("\n\nBefore taskid=%d T=%d record=%d t
=%d ",taskid, TT, record , t);
int b=0;
printf("Cipher/EP:\t");








unsigned char * keyp = key;






if (debug==3) printf("\t%d", t);
unsigned char *Res = (unsigned char *) malloc (BS);
memcpy (CipherT, Encrypt (key, clear, BS, Res), BS);
free (Res);
//printf(" 3.x memcpy .....\n");
//key = CipherT; /// this used to work because they were not
sepatrate memory address
//////////memcpy (key, CipherT, BS); // this one actually moves the value.
//printf("T=%d record=%d t=%d CT==%04x %04x= Ky==%04x %04x=\n
",TT, record , t, CipherT[0],CipherT[1], key[0], key[1]);
if (debug==3) {
if (taskid ==1){
printf("\n\nAfterr taskid=%d T=%d record=%d t=%d ",taskid,
TT, record , t);













unsigned char * keyp = key;
b=0;





unsigned char * sppp = SPp;







memcpy (key, CipherT, BS); // this one actually moves the value.
}
//printf("\ncore:%d DONE LOOP record=%d .....\n",taskid, record);
//printf(".....\n");
//memcpy(&EP[record+0], CipherT, BS);








RegenerateKeyndPoint (unsigned char *SPp, unsigned char *EPp, int BS, int
record, int taskid,
unsigned char *RecoveredKey, int TT)
{
int t = 0;
unsigned char *CipherT;
CipherT = malloc (BS);
unsigned char *key;
key = malloc (BS);
unsigned char *SPpa = SPp;
memcpy (key, SPpa, BS);
memcpy (CipherT, SPpa, BS);
unsigned char *Res = (unsigned char *) malloc (BS);
//memcpy (CipherT, Encrypt (key, clear, BS, Res), BS);
//free (Res);
for (t = 0; t < TT; t++)
{
//printf("%d",t);
memcpy (CipherT, Encrypt (key, clear, BS, Res), BS);
memcpy (key, CipherT, BS);
}
free(Res);
memcpy (RecoveredKey, CipherT, BS);
unsigned char *rkaddr = RecoveredKey;
int c = 0;
printf ("\tRcoveredKey is:::::: ");













* Create a string of binary digits based on the input value.
* Input:
* val: value to convert.
* buff: buffer to write to must be >= sz+1 chars.
* sz: size of buffer.
* Returns address of string or NULL if not enough space provided.
* */
static char *
binrep (unsigned int val, char *buff, int sz)
{
char *pbuff = buff;
/* Must be able to store one character at least. */
if (sz < 1)
return NULL;
/* Special case for zero to ensure some output. */






/* Work from the end of the buffer back. */
pbuff += sz;
*pbuff-- = ’\0’;
/* For each bit (going backwards) store character. */
while (val != 0)
{
if (sz-- == 0)
return NULL;
*pbuff-- = ((val & 1) == 1) ? ’1’ : ’0’;
/* Get next bit. */
val >>= 1;
}




searchEPforCT (unsigned char *SPp, unsigned char *EPp, int rank, int
offset, int recordQ,
unsigned char *reduced_, unsigned char *encrypted_, int t,
double BlockSizeBytes,
unsigned char *OriginalKey, unsigned char *OriginalCT) //
OriginalCT is different from encrypted because it doesnt
change (reencrypt)everytime
{




if (t < 0)
return (-1);
int record = 0;
int i = 0;
int lead = 0;
int done = 0;
int finished =0;
/* http://en.cppreference.com/w/c/string/byte/strcmp */
for (i = 0; i < recordQ; i = i + 1)
{
int cntr = 0;
int same = 0;
unsigned char *EPpa = &EPp[i];
unsigned char *CTpa = encrypted_;
for (cntr = 0; cntr < BlockSizeBytes; cntr++)
{
if (debug==2) printf ("\n@@@@@ Rank %d , Record %d T %d --
Comparing # %d CT byte [%02x]&[%02x] the EP byte \n", rank, i, t
, cntr, *CTpa, *EPpa);
if (*CTpa == *EPpa)
{
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//printf ("\n@@@@@ Rank %d , Record %d T %d -- Comparing # %d
CT byte [%02x]&[%02x] the EP byte \n", rank, i, t, cntr,
*CTpa, *EPpa);
same = same + 1;
if (same > 2)
{
if (debug==2)
printf ("\n @@@@@ Rank %d , Record %d T %d-- Yaaaa %d
similar blocks up to %d- %c _ %02x = %c _%02x \n",













if (same == BlockSizeBytes)
{ // BlockSizeBytes)
if (debug >= 2) printf
("\n\nX>>>>>>>>>>>>> inside search : Yaaaay We have a lead t=%d
core=%d m=%d . BS is %d and same_bytes are %d ",
t, rank, i, BlockSizeBytes, same);
record = i;
lead = 1;
/*Now i need to extract the key by Calculating from SPi T-1 */
unsigned char *RecoveredKey;
RecoveredKey = malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
unsigned char *SPppp = &SPp[i];
//printf("\nxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>>>> %
c%c%c%c \n",*SPppp++, *SPppp++, *SPppp++, *SPppp);
int result =
RegenerateKeyndPoint (&SPp[i], &EPp[i], BlockSizeBytes, record,
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rank, RecoveredKey, t - 1);
printf ("\nYaaaay lead at t=%d core=%d, m=%d, key1stB_%c_",
t, rank, i, *RecoveredKey);
int b = 0;
printf (" Orig PT:");
for (b = 0; b < BlockSizeBytes; b++)
{
printf ("_[%c][%02x]_", clear[b], clear[b]);
}
printf (" Found CT:");
unsigned char *eppp = EPp;;
for (b = 0; b < BlockSizeBytes; b++)
{
printf ("_[%c][%02x]_", *eppp, *eppp);
eppp++;
}
printf (" Recovered Key(EP-1):");
unsigned char *keyp = RecoveredKey;
for (b = 0; b < BlockSizeBytes; b++)
{
printf ("_[%c][%02x]_", *keyp, *keyp);
keyp++;
}
printf (" Chain SP:");
unsigned char *sppp = SPp;
for (b = 0; b < BlockSizeBytes; b++)
{
printf ("_[%c][%02x]_", *sppp, *sppp);
sppp++;
}
printf (" Orig CT:");
unsigned char *octp = OriginalCT;
for (b = 0; b < BlockSizeBytes; b++)
{




printf (" Orig Key:");
unsigned char *okyp = OriginalKey;
for (b = 0; b < BlockSizeBytes; b++)
{
printf ("_[%c][%02x]_", *okyp, *okyp);
okyp++;
}
printf (" CT 4 verify:");
unsigned char *verifyCT;
verifyCT = malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
unsigned char *__result= malloc (BlockSizeBytes);




unsigned char * vctp = verifyCT;
for (b = 0; b < BlockSizeBytes; b++)
{






for (b = 0; b < BlockSizeBytes; b++)
{
//printf(" Verifying... [%02x][%02x]..", *vctp, *octp);
if (*vctp++ == *octp++){
bytesVerified++;
if (bytesVerified==BlockSizeBytes){
















/*What if we couldn’t find it in the EP’s of T. We need to do it for T-1
*/








ReducedCTC2 = malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
Y2CTC = malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
unsigned char *Res = (unsigned char *) malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
//memcpy (CipherT, Encrypt (key, clear, BS, Res), BS);
//free (Res);
memcpy (Y2CTC, Encrypt (encrypted_, clear, BlockSizeBytes, Res),
BlockSizeBytes);
free (Res);
//ReducedCTC2 = malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
record =
searchEPforCT (SPp, EPp, rank, offset, recordQ, ReducedCTC2, Y2CTC,









testEncDec (int rank, int BlockSizeBytes, unsigned char *TestKy, unsigned
char *TestCT,







start = clock ();
int b = 0;





int x = 0;
printf ("\n\ttestEncDec: Yaaa Test Key\t : ");




printf ("\n\ttestEncDec: Yaaa Clear text\t : ");




unsigned char *Res = (unsigned char *) malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
//memcpy (CipherT, Encrypt (key, clear, BS, Res), BS);
//free (Res);




printf ("\n\ttestEncDec: Yaaa Encrypted text\t : ");




unsigned char * ___result= malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
memcpy (TestRT, Decrypt (TestKy, TestCT, BlockSizeBytes, ___result),
BlockSizeBytes);
free(___result);
printf ("\n\ttestEncDec: Yaaa Decrypted text\t : ");





end = clock ();
cpu_time_used = ((float) (end - start)) / CLOCKS_PER_SEC;





calculateLFSR (int BlockSizeBits, unsigned char **LFSRSP, int rank,
unsigned char **SP,
int recordQuota, uint32_t lfsrNOTNEEDED)
{




int BlockSizeBytes = BlockSizeBits / 8;
printf ("\nrank %d before memcpy
------------------------------------",
rank);
memcpy (&lfsr32, LFSRSP[rank - 1], BlockSizeBytes);
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printf ("\nrank %d after memcpy------------------------------------",
rank);
int period = 0;





unsigned char lo = lfsr32 & 0xFF;
unsigned char b1 = lfsr32 >> 8;
unsigned char b2 = lfsr32 >> 16;
unsigned char hi = lfsr32 >> 24;
memcpy (SP[period], &lfsr32, BlockSizeBytes);
/* char *adrss= SP[period];
printf("\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>FINDME........Child Process %d inside
Lfsr value in SP is: ", rank);
int bbb=0;




period = period + 1; //BlockSizeBytes;
/*primitive polynomial from Kali: y^32 + y^15 + y^9 + y^7 +
y^4 + y^3 + 1
tap sequence [32, 7, 3, 2, 0]
wikipedia polynomial= x^32 + x^7
+ X^3 + X^2 + X^0
*/
bit32 =
((lfsr32 >> (BlockSizeBits - 32)) ^
(lfsr32 >> (BlockSizeBits - 7)) ^ (lfsr32 >> (BlockSizeBits -
3))
^ (lfsr32 >> (BlockSizeBits - 2))) & 1;
lfsr32 = (lfsr32 >> 1) | (bit32 << (BlockSizeBits - 1));
}
while (period < recordQuota);
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printf ("M======= core %d just LFSRd %d times. >>>>>\n", rank, period
);
}
else if (BlockSize == 48)
{
uint64_t lfsr64 = 0x0000555555FF0000u;
uint16_t lfsr48[]={ 0x0123, 0x4567, 0x89ab };
uint64_t bit64;
int BlockSizeBytes = BlockSizeBits / 8;
printf ("\nrank %d before memcpy
------------------------------------",
rank);
memcpy (&lfsr64, LFSRSP[rank - 1], BlockSizeBytes);
printf ("\nrank %d after memcpy------------------------------------",
rank);
int period = 0;





char lo = lfsr48 & 0xFF;
char b1 = lfsr48 >> 8;
char b2 = lfsr48 >> 16;
char h3 = lfsr48 >> 24;
char b4 = lfsr48 >> 32;
char hi = lfsr48 >> 40;*/
memcpy (SP[period], &lfsr64, BlockSizeBytes);
period = period + 1; //BlockSizeBytes;
/*primitive polynomial from Kali: y^32 + y^15 + y^9 + y^7 +
y^4 + y^3 + 1
* tap sequence [32, 7, 3, 2, 0]
* wikipedia polynomial= x^32 +
x^7 + X^3 +
X^2 + X^0 */
261
bit64 =
(( lfsr64 >> (BlockSizeBits - 32)) ^
( lfsr64 >> (BlockSizeBits - 7)) ^
( lfsr64 >> (BlockSizeBits - 3)) ^
( lfsr64 >> (BlockSizeBits - 2))) & 1;
lfsr64 = ( lfsr64 >> 1) | (bit64 << (BlockSizeBits - 1));
}
while (period < recordQuota);






main (int argc, char **argv)
{
clock_t just_started, before_lfsr_seed, before_dispatch, before_results,
just_finished;





just_started = clock ();
//printf ("\nA============================= 0 \n");
int skipSort = 0;
unsigned long long BlockSizeBits = BlockSize; // 16 bits key and block
size
unsigned long long BlockSizeBytes = BlockSizeBits / 8; // In bytes
clear = malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
/* 8 32 64 128 */
unsigned char st[] = "PTPTPTPTPTPTPTPT";
//printf ("\nA============================= 0.1 \n");
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memcpy (clear, st, BlockSizeBytes);
CTchallenge = malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
CTchallengeArray = malloc (BlockSizeBytes * 100);
ChallengeKey = malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
ChallengeKeyArray = malloc (BlockSizeBytes * 100);
unsigned char ck[] = "KCKCKCKCKCKCKCKC";
//printf ("\nA============================= 0.3 \n");
memcpy (ChallengeKey, ck, BlockSizeBytes);
unsigned char *Res = (unsigned char *) malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
printf
("C sillybilly ========================== /** / and INkey is: ");
unsigned char * v_ = ChallengeKey ; int s_=0;
for (s_=0; s_<BlockSizeBytes; s_++){ printf("[%d_%02x]",s_, *v_); v_
++;}
printf(" \n");
//memcpy (CipherT, Encrypt (key, clear, BS, Res), BS);
//free (Res);
//printf ("\nA============================= 0.4 \n");




("C silly ========================== /** / \t\t and CT forChallenge
is: ");
unsigned char * verifyCTCptrx = CTchallenge ; int sillycounterx=0;
for (sillycounterx=0; sillycounterx<BlockSizeBytes; sillycounterx++){





verifyPT_ = malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
unsigned char * _result= malloc (BlockSizeBytes);




unsigned char * vptp_ = verifyPT_;
printf ("\nsillybilly and when CT is decryoted it is back to : \t");
int b_=0; for (b_ = 0; b_ < BlockSizeBytes; b_++)
{




//assert (*vptp_ == *s_ );
free (verifyPT_);
//printf ("\nA============================= 0.5 \n");
ReducedCTC = malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
//printf ("\nA============================= 0.6 \n");
uint32_t start_state32 = 0x434B434Bu;
int ArraySizeInBytes = Total_M * BlockSizeBytes;
//int V = ArraySizeInBytes / Cores;
int i, rank, size, dest, src, tag;
double requiredMemoryInMegaBytes = ArraySizeInBytes * 2 / 1024 / 1024;
double memoryPerCoreInMegaBytes = 2 * 1024 ;
// printf ("\nA============================= requires memory in
megabytes = ArraySizeInBytes %d x2/1024/1024 = %d \n", ArraySizeInBytes
, requiredMemoryMB);





unsigned char PTArray[]= "KCKCKCKCKCKC Prof. Guang Gong, Ph.D., IEEE
Fellow Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Office: EIT
4158 Tel: (519) 888-4567 x 35650 Fax: (519) 746-3077 Email: Homepage:
http://comsec.uwaterloo.ca/~ggong/ (or access from ECE Dept.
homepage) Prof. Mark Aagaard, Ph.D. Department of Electrical and
Computer Engineering Office: DC 2539 Tel: (519) 888-4567 x 33138
Email: Homepage: https://ece.uwaterloo.ca/~maagaard/ (or access from
ECE Dept. homepage) Our Research Areas Lightweight cryptography,
cryptography and elliptic curve cryptography Signal design for
wireless CDMA, OFDM and MIMO communications Security in cloud,
network, ad-hoc network and RFID systems Wireless and multimedia
communication security Security and privacy in machine-to-machine
communication";
KYArray = (unsigned char **) calloc ( numbreOfChallenges, sizeof (
unsigned char *));
if (KYArray == NULL)
{
fprintf (stderr, "not enough memory for Challenge Array\n");
}
unsigned char *blobzz = malloc ( numbreOfChallenges * BlockSizeBytes *
sizeof (unsigned char));
if (blobzz == NULL)
{




memcpy (blobzz, PTArray , BlockSizeBytes * numbreOfChallenges );
}
int iizz = 0;
for (iizz = 0; iizz < numbreOfChallenges; iizz++)
{




//printf ("\nA============================= 0.8 \n");
CTArray = (unsigned char **) calloc ( numbreOfChallenges, sizeof (
unsigned char *));
if (CTArray == NULL)
{
fprintf (stderr, "not enough memory for Challenge Array\n");
}
unsigned char *blobzzz = calloc ( numbreOfChallenges , BlockSizeBytes *
sizeof (unsigned char));
if (blobzzz == NULL)
{




int iizzz = 0;
for (iizzz = 0; iizzz < numbreOfChallenges; iizzz++)
{
unsigned char * KYAp = (unsigned char *) KYArray[iizzz] ;
unsigned char * Ress = (unsigned char *) malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
CTArray[iizzz] = &blobzzz[iizzz * BlockSizeBytes];
unsigned char * CTAp = (unsigned char *) CTArray[iizzz] ;
memcpy ( CTAp, Encrypt ( KYAp, clear, BlockSizeBytes, Ress),
BlockSizeBytes);
unsigned char * ctp = CTArray[iizzz];
unsigned char * ptp = clear;
unsigned char * kyp = KYArray[iizzz];
int bb=0;
for (bb=0; bb<BlockSizeBytes; bb++){
printf("\nkey %d count %d PTx[%02x] PTc[%c] KYx[%02x] KYc[%c
] CTx[%02x] CTc[] >>",iizzz, bb, *ptp, *ptp, *kyp, *kyp,
*ctp /*, *ctp*/);
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printf("\t... PTx[%02x] PTc[%c] KYx[%02x] KYc[%c] CTx[%02x]
CTc[%c]", *ptp, *ptp, *KYAp, *KYAp, *CTAp, *CTAp);
//printf("\n PTx[%02x] PTc[%c] KYx[%02x] KYc[%c] CTx[%02x]
", *ptp, *ptp, *kyp, *kyp, *ctp);
//printf("\n PTx[%02x] PTc[%c] KYx[%02x] KYc[%c] ", *ptp, *
ptp, *kyp, *kyp);
// //printf("\n
PTx[%02x] PTc[%c] KYx[%02x] ", *ptp, *ptp, *kyp);
//
//printf("\n PTx[%02x] PTc[%c] ", *ptp, *ptp );
ctp++; kyp++; ptp++; CTAp++; KYAp++;
}









for (sss=0; sss<numbreOfChallenges; sss++){
int bb=0;
char * ctp = CTArray[sss];
char * ptp = clear;
char * kyp = KYArray[sss];
for (bb=0; bb<BlockSizeBytes; bb++){
//printf("\n PTx[%02x] PTc[%c] KYx[%02x] KYc[%c] CTx[%02x]
CTc[%c]", *ptp, *ptp, *kyp, *kyp, *ctp, *ctp);
//printf("\n PTx[%02x] PTc[%c] KYx[%02x] KYc[%c] CTx[%02x]
", *ptp, *ptp, *kyp, *kyp, *ctp);
printf("\n PTx[%02x] PTc[%c] KYx[%02x] KYc[%c] ", *ptp, *ptp
, *kyp, *kyp);
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//printf("\n PTx[%02x] PTc[%c] KYx[%02x] ", *ptp, *ptp, *kyp
);
//printf("\n PTx[%02x] PTc[%c] ", *ptp, *ptp );
ctp++; kyp++; ptp++;
}
printf("xxxx..................................... %d <==>\t %c \t










int xxxxx = test_test_vector();
//printf ("\nA============================= 1 \n");
//http://stackoverflow.com/questions/2614249/dynamic-memory-for-2d-char-
array







int Cores = size - 1; //TODO deduct the one again





//printf ("\nA============================= 0 \n");
int V = 0;
if (Cores > 0)
V = ArraySizeInBytes / Cores;
unsigned int Total_Mi= Total_M;
//unsigned int ttmm= (unsigned int ) Total_M /Cores;
unsigned int recordQuota = Total_Mi /Cores;
Total_Mi = Cores * recordQuota;
//unsigned int recordQuota = (unsigned int) recordQuotaX;
//int MrecordPerCoreRem = ((int)ttmm % Cores); //Total_M % Cores;
printf ("\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Cores %d ... Total_M %d .. recordQuota %d \n", Cores, Total_Mi,
recordQuota);
//if (MrecordPerCoreRem) {Total_M = Cores * recordQuota ;}
//assert (MrecordPerCoreRem == 0);




if (rank == 0)
printf ("\nGREPME::: rank:%d Cores:%d usableCores:%d
requiredMemoryInMegaBytes:%G memoryPerCoreInMegaBytes:%G PID:%d Ref
%s \n",
rank, size, Cores, getpid (), requiredMemoryInMegaBytes,
memoryPerCoreInMegaBytes, argv[0]);
int winner = 0;
/* TODO Do I really need a different key, or should i send the initial
key??? since I recreate the whole schedule i should probably send the
initial key.
* * TODO why do i need to flip the 2 n words at the end of
decryption? */





































uint16_t lfsr48[]={ 0x0123, 0x4567, 0x89ab };
uint16_t bit48[]={ 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000 };
uint16_t start_state = 0xACE1u; /* Any nonzero start state will work.
*/
// uint32_t start_state32 = 0x434B434Bu;
270
uint64_t start_state64 = 0x434B434B434B434Bu;
//uint64_t start_state64 = 0x0000555555FF0000u;
uint16_t lfsr = start_state;
uint32_t lfsr32 = start_state32;
uint64_t lfsr64 = start_state64;
uint16_t bit; /* Must be 16bit to allow bit<<15 later in
the code */
uint32_t bit32;
uint64_t bit64; /* Must be 16bit to allow bit<<15 later in
the code */
unsigned period = 0;
unsigned char buff[BlockSize + 1];
unsigned long long BruteForceNumberOfComputations = pow (2,
BlockSizeBits); //Exhaustive search
unsigned long long WallTime = 48 * 60 * 60; // 2 days in unit-seconds
//double recordQuota = (double) ((double)ttmm / (double)Cores);
//int M = Total_M / Cores;




int tag_M2C_SP = 0;
int tag_M2C_LFSRSP = 3;
int tag_M2C_EP = 1;





TestKy = malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
TestPT = malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
TestCT = malloc (BlockSizeBytes);





/* int numbreOfChallenges =100;
char **CTArray;
char **KYArray;
char PTArray[]= "Prof. Guang Gong, Ph.D., IEEE Fellow Department of
Electrical and Computer Engineering Office: EIT 4158 Tel: (519)
888-4567 x 35650 Fax: (519) 746-3077 Email: Homepage: http://comsec.
uwaterloo.ca/~ggong/ (or access from ECE Dept. homepage) Prof. Mark
Aagaard, Ph.D. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Office: DC 2539 Tel: (519) 888-4567 x 33138 Email: Homepage: https://
ece.uwaterloo.ca/~maagaard/ (or access from ECE Dept. homepage) Our
Research Areas Lightweight cryptography, cryptography and elliptic
curve cryptography Signal design for wireless CDMA, OFDM and MIMO
communications Security in cloud, network, ad-hoc network and RFID
systems Wireless and multimedia communication security Security and
privacy in machine-to-machine communication";
KYArray = (char **) calloc ( numbreOfChallenges, sizeof (char *));
if (KYArray == NULL)
{
fprintf (stderr, "not enough memory for Challenge Array\n");
}
char *blobzz = malloc ( numbreOfChallenges * BlockSizeBytes * sizeof (
char));
if (blobzz == NULL)
{




memcpy (blobzz, PTArray , BlockSizeBytes * numbreOfChallenges );
}
int iizz = 0;
for (iizz = 0; iizz < numbreOfChallenges; iizz++)
{
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/* CTArray = (char **) calloc ( numbreOfChallenges, sizeof (char *));
if (CTArray == NULL)
{
fprintf (stderr, "not enough memory for Challenge Array\n");
}
char *blobzzz = malloc ( numbreOfChallenges * BlockSizeBytes * sizeof (
char));
if (blobzzz == NULL)
{




int iizzz = 0;
for (iizzz = 0; iizzz < numbreOfChallenges; iizzz++)
{
char * Ress = (char *) malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
CTArray[iizzz] = &blobzzz[iizzz * BlockSizeBytes];






SP = (unsigned char **) calloc (recordQuota, sizeof (unsigned char *));
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if (SP == NULL)
{
fprintf (stderr, "not enough memory for SP\n");
}
unsigned char *blob = malloc (recordQuota * BlockSizeBytes * sizeof (
unsigned char));
if (blob == NULL)
{
fprintf (stderr, "not enough memory for SP Blob\n");
}
int ii = 0;
for (ii = 0; ii < recordQuota; ii++)
{
SP[ii] = &blob[ii * BlockSizeBytes];
}
// printf("\n.%d.\n",ii);
//printf ("\nbfore2 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ArraySizeInBytes %d\n",
ArraySizeInBytes);
EP = (unsigned char **) calloc (recordQuota, sizeof (unsigned char *));
if (EP == NULL)
{
fprintf (stderr, "not enough memory for EP\n");
}
unsigned char *blobEP = malloc (recordQuota * BlockSizeBytes * sizeof (
unsigned char));
if (blobEP == NULL)
{
fprintf (stderr, "not enough memory for EP Blob\n");
}
int iii = 0;
for (iii = 0; iii < recordQuota; iii++)
{
EP[iii] = &blobEP[iii * BlockSizeBytes];
}
// printf("\n.%d.\n",iii);
//printf ("\nafter ++++++++++++++++++ArraySizeInBytes %d\n",
ArraySizeInBytes);
LFSRSP = (unsigned char **) calloc (Cores, sizeof (unsigned char *));
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if (LFSRSP == NULL)
{
fprintf (stderr, "not enough memory dor LFSRSP....really...\n");
}
unsigned char *blobLFSRSP = malloc (Cores * BlockSizeBytes * sizeof (
unsigned char));
if (blobLFSRSP == NULL)
{
fprintf (stderr, "not enough memory for LFSRSP Blob\n");
}
int iiii = 0;
for (iiii = 0; iiii < Cores; iiii++)
{
LFSRSP[iiii] = &blobLFSRSP[iiii * BlockSizeBytes];
}
/**************************************************/
//printf ("\nthread %d [a]+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n", rank);
MPI_Type_vector (BlockSizeBytes, 1, 1, MPI_UNSIGNED_CHAR, &BlockSize32);
int xyza= sizeof(BlockSize32);
///MPI_Type_vector (1, BlockSizeBytes, 1, MPI_UNSIGNED_CHAR, &
BlockSize32);
printf ("\nthread %d [b]+++++++++++++++++++ sizeof BlockSize32 %d \n
", rank, xyza );
MPI_Type_commit (&BlockSize32);
//printf ("\nthread %d [c
]+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n", rank);
//MPI_Type_vector (V, 1, 1, MPI_UNSIGNED_CHAR, &SubArrOfBlockSize16);
//printf ("\nthread %d [d
]+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n", rank);
//MPI_Type_commit (&SubArrOfBlockSize16);
printf ("\nthread %d [e]
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\n", rank);











// printf ("\n4- Vector Chunk is %d as full SP array size in bytes is












EncProtocol = malloc (7);
memcpy (EncProtocol, CipherTypes[CipherUnderAttack], 6);
//printf("String type defined \n");
int y = 0;
int sample = 10;
double sumsum = 0;
/*
for (y=0; y<sample; y++){
//TODO: fix testEncDecaverage time calculation
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sumsum=testEncDec( rank, BlockSizeBytes, TestKy, TestCT, TestPT ,
TestRT);
}
printf("\n========================== Tested %d %s encryption %d
times and the average is %d \n",CipherUnderAttack, EncProtocol,
sample, (sumsum/sample));
*/
//printf ("\n6- Vector Chunk is %d as full SP array size in bytes is
%d and usable cores are: %d\n",V, ArraySizeInBytes,Cores);




/* for (i = 0; i < ArraySizeInBytes; i++){
SP[i] = i + ’0’;
EP[i] = i + ’0’;
} */
/** Visual verification*/
/*for (i = 0; i < ArraySizeInBytes; i=i+BlockSizeBytes){ //printf(" %
c", SP[i]);
printf ("[C%d/%d][M%d/%d/%d][T%d/%d/%d/%d]\t[LFSR][lfsr: %llu, \t
%s \tSP=%c%c=\tEP=%c%c=]\n", rank, Cores, i, M, Total_M, 0, T,
WallTime, BruteForceNumberOfComputations, lfsr, binrep( lfsr ,
buff , BlockSize ),SP[i+0],SP[i+1],EP[i+0],EP[i+1]);
} */
printf
("========================== /** Done Initializing the arrays*/ \n
");
before_lfsr_seed = clock ();
//printf("10- BlockSizeBytes: %d, period: %d , V= %d\n",BlockSizeBytes,
period, V);
printf
("==========================/** Randomizing the array values usinf
LFSRs for specific Block Sizes*/ \n");











/* taps: 16 14 13 11; feedback polynomial: x^16 + x^14 + x^13
+ x^11 + 1 */
/* bit = ((lfsr >> (16-16)) ^ (lfsr >> (16-14)) ^ (lfsr
>> (16-13)) ^ (lfsr >> (16-11)) ) & 1; */
bit =
((lfsr >> 0) ^ (lfsr >> 2) ^ (lfsr >> 3) ^ (lfsr >> 5)) & 1;
lfsr = (lfsr >> 1) | (bit << (BlockSize - 1));
/*http://stackoverflow.com/questions/13279024/convert-a-uint16
-t-to-char2-to-be-sent-over-socket-unix */
unsigned char lo = lfsr & 0xFF;
unsigned char hi = lfsr >> 8;
memcpy (&SP[period + 0], &lo, 1);
memcpy (&SP[period + 1], &hi, 1);
// printf ("[C%d/%d][M%d/%d/%d][T%d/%d/%d/%d]\t[LFSR][
lfsr: %llu, \t %s \tSP=%c%c=\tEP=%c%c=]\n", rank, Cores,
period, M, Total_M, 0, T, WallTime,
BruteForceNumberOfComputations, lfsr, binrep( lfsr , buff
, BlockSize ),SP[period+0],SP[period+1],EP[period+0],EP[
period+1]);
period = period + BlockSizeBytes;
// while ( (lfsr != start_state) && (period <ArraySizeInBytes)
);
}
while (period < ArraySizeInBytes);
}
else if (BlockSize == 8)
{
}
else if (BlockSize == 48)
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{period = 0;
int lfsrspcount = 0;
do
{
/*char lo = lfsr48 & 0xFF;
char b1 = lfsr48 >> 8;
char b2 = lfsr48 >> 16;
char b3 = lfsr48 >> 24;
char b4 = lfsr48 >> 32;
char hi = lfsr48 >> 40;*/
int rq = ( int)recordQuota;
int remainder = period % rq; //(Total_M / Cores);
if (remainder == 0)
{
memcpy (LFSRSP[lfsrspcount], &lfsr64, BlockSizeBytes);
/*printf
("\n________Rank %d period %d ------>>> Copied lfsr: %4x
into LFSRSP[%d] \t",
rank, period, lfsr64, lfsrspcount);
*/
unsigned char *SPaddrs = LFSRSP[lfsrspcount];
int blks = 0;










period = period + 1;
bit64 =
(( lfsr64 >> (BlockSizeBits - 32)) ^
( lfsr64 >> (BlockSizeBits - 7)) ^
( lfsr64 >> (BlockSizeBits - 3)) ^
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( lfsr64 >> (BlockSizeBits - 2))) & 1;
lfsr64 = ( lfsr64 >> 1) | (bit64 << (BlockSizeBits - 1));
}
while (period < Total_Mi); //ArraySizeInBytes);
printf ("M======= we just LFSRd %d times. >>>>>\n", period);
}
else if (BlockSize == 32)
{
period = 0;





unsigned char lo = lfsr32 & 0xFF;
unsigned char b1 = lfsr32 >> 8;
unsigned char b2 = lfsr32 >> 16;
unsigned char hi = lfsr32 >> 24;
int remainder = period % (Total_M / Cores);
if (remainder == 0)
{
memcpy (LFSRSP[lfsrspcount], &lfsr32, BlockSizeBytes);
printf
("\nRank %d period %d ------>>> Copied lfsr: %4x into
LFSRSP[%d] \t",
rank, period, lfsr32, lfsrspcount);
unsigned char *SPaddrs = LFSRSP[lfsrspcount];
int blks = 0;











// printf ("\nRank %d period %d ------>>> skip lfsr:










period = period + 1; //BlockSizeBytes;
/*primitive polynomial from Kali: y^32 + y^15 + y^9 + y
^7 + y^4 + y^3 +
1 */
//tap sequence [32, 7, 3, 2, 0]
/* wikipedia polynomial= x^32 + x
^7 + X^3 + X
^2 + X^0 */
bit32 =
((lfsr32 >> (BlockSizeBits - 32)) ^
(lfsr32 >> (BlockSizeBits - 7)) ^ (lfsr32 >>
(BlockSizeBits -
3)) ^ (lfsr32 >>
(BlockSizeBits -
2))) & 1;
lfsr32 = (lfsr32 >> 1) | (bit32 << (BlockSizeBits - 1));
/////////XXXX printf (" %d",period);
}
while (period < Total_M); //ArraySizeInBytes);
printf ("M======= we just LFSRd %d times. >>>>>\n", period);
}




else if (BlockSize == 48)
{
/*Kali primitive polynomial: y^48 + y^25 + y^23 + y^17 + y^12 + y
^11 + y^10 + y^8 + y^7 + y^3 + 1 */
/* y^96 + y^63 + y^61 + y^60 + y^59 + y^54 + y^50 + y^46 + y^44 +
y^40 + y^37 + y^33 + y^32 + y^28 + y^24 + y^23 + y^21 + y^20
+ y^19 + y^18 + y^16 + y^15 + y^14 + y^13 + y^11 + y^9 + y^8 +
y^7 + y^6 + y^4 + y^3 + y^2 + 1
*
* y^128 + y^7 + y^2 + y + 1 */
}
else if (BlockSize == 56)
{
}





/* polynomial= x^56 + x^2 + X^4 +
X^7 + 1 */
bit64 =
((lfsr64 >> (BlockSizeBits - 56)) ^
(lfsr64 >> (BlockSizeBits - 7)) ^ (lfsr64 >>
(BlockSizeBits -
4)) ^ (lfsr64 >>
(BlockSizeBits -
2))) & 1;
lfsr64 = (lfsr64 >> 1) | (bit64 << (BlockSizeBits - 1));
//printf ("\nlfsr: %llu, %s", lfsr64, binrep( lfsr64 , buff ,
BlockSizeBits ));
unsigned char lo = lfsr64 & 0xFF;
unsigned char b1 = lfsr64 >> 8;
unsigned char b2 = lfsr64 >> 16;
unsigned char b3 = lfsr64 >> 24;
unsigned char b4 = lfsr64 >> 32;
unsigned char b5 = lfsr64 >> 40;
unsigned char b6 = lfsr64 >> 48;
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unsigned char hi = lfsr64 >> 56;
memcpy (&SP[period + 0], &lo, 1);
memcpy (&SP[period + 1], &b1, 1);
memcpy (&SP[period + 2], &b2, 1);
memcpy (&SP[period + 3], &b3, 1);
memcpy (&SP[period + 4], &b4, 1);
memcpy (&SP[period + 5], &b5, 1);
memcpy (&SP[period + 6], &b6, 1);
memcpy (&SP[period + 7], &hi, 1);
period = period + BlockSizeBytes;
}




("\nP==========================/** Done Randomizing the array
values usinf LFSR*/ \n");
/*
int p=0; for (p=0; p< Total_M; p++){
char *adrs= SP[p];
int bb=0;





before_dispatch = clock ();
master_time_to_seed =
((float) (before_dispatch - before_lfsr_seed)) / CLOCKS_PER_SEC;
printf ("\n\tmaster_time_to_seed \t : %G \n\n\n ",
master_time_to_seed);
printf




/** Define the Dispatch vector**/
/** Dispatch to child processes */
int r = 0;
for (r = 1; r <= Cores; r++)
{
int offset = (r - 1) * recordQuota;
int chunkkk = recordQuota * sizeof (unsigned char *);
unsigned char * adrss= CTchallenge; //LFSRSP[r - 1]; //SP[offset
];
/*printf("FINDME ....=========== master Process sending Vector
offset %d and first pointer SP is:%d and value is \t",
offset, adrss);
int bbb=0;





printf("master will send to slave\t\t\t ");
MPI_Send (LFSRSP[r - 1], 1, BlockSize32, r, tag_M2C_LFSRSP,
MPI_COMM_WORLD);
printf("master finished sending.....\n ");
//MPI_Send(SP[offset], 1 , SubArrOfBlockSize16, r, tag_M2C_SP,
MPI_COMM_WORLD);
//MPI_Send(EP[offset], 1 , SubArrOfBlockSize16, r, tag_M2C_EP,
MPI_COMM_WORLD);









pFile = fopen ("/scratch/m/maagaard/knassar/winners_32bit.txt", "w");
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printf
("\nP==========================/**Created results file and Waiting
for Child processes**/ \n");
before_results = clock ();
winner = 0;
for (r = 1; r <= Cores; r++)
{
MPI_Recv (&winner, 1, MPI_INT, r, tag_C2M_WNR, MPI_COMM_WORLD,
&status);
//printf("\nP========================== /** Received Process %d
results %d*/ ", r, winner)
/* if ( ((r-1)*recordQuota) == winner ) {
printf("\t[[]]Yaaay winner %d \n", winner);
if (pFile!=NULL){
char logEntry[100];
sprintf( logEntry, "False positive Winner: [Thread %d ][win %d
]-\n", r, winner);
fputs ( logEntry, pFile);
}else{
printf("Could not write to file..\n");
}
} else */
if (winner != -1)
{
printf ("\t[[]]Yaaay winner %d \n", winner);
if (pFile != NULL)
{
char logEntry[100];
sprintf (logEntry, "Winner: [Thread %d ][win %d]-\n", r,
winner);
fputs (logEntry, pFile);












("\nP==== Collected results, closing the result file and shutting
down\n");
fclose (pFile);





{ /*child process */
awaiting_dispatch = clock ();
int offset = (rank - 1) * recordQuota;
int chunkk = recordQuota * sizeof (unsigned char *);
printf ("C silly ========================== /** Child Process %d
waiting */ \t\t and CT is: ", rank);
unsigned char * verifyCTCptr = CTchallenge ; int sillycounter=0;
for (sillycounter=0; sillycounter<BlockSizeBytes; sillycounter++){
printf("%d_%02x ",sillycounter, *verifyCTCptr); verifyCTCptr++;}
printf("\n");
//sleep (rank);
//MPI_Recv (LFSRSP[rank - 1], 1, BlockSize32, src, tag_M2C_LFSRSP,
MPI_COMM_WORLD, &status);
MPI_Recv (LFSRSP[rank - 1], 1, BlockSize32, src, tag_M2C_LFSRSP,
MPI_COMM_WORLD, &status);
printf ("C silly ========================== rank %d done waiting
<<<<<<<<<< \n ", rank);
/////XXXXX
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// MPI_Recv(SP[offset], 1 , SubArrOfBlockSize16, src, tag_M2C_SP,
MPI_COMM_WORLD, &status);
// MPI_Recv(EP[offset], 1 , SubArrOfBlockSize16, src, tag_M2C_EP,
MPI_COMM_WORLD, &status);
{
unsigned char *Resss = (unsigned char *) malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
unsigned char *CTchallengess = (unsigned char *) malloc (
BlockSizeBytes);
memcpy (CTchallengess, Encrypt (ChallengeKey, clear, BlockSizeBytes,
Resss),
BlockSizeBytes);
unsigned char * verifyCTCptrxss = CTchallengess ; int rxss=0;
printf ("C silly Afterr ====== CT forChallenge (calc inside child) is
: ");






before_randomizing = clock ();
// printf




unsigned char * adrss= LFSRSP[rank - 1]; //SP[offset];
int bbb=0;
/*printf("FINDME....====================== /** Child Process %d
received Vector offset %d and first pointer SP is:%d and value
is ", rank, offset, adrss);










printf("FINDME....====================== /** Child Process %d
first lfsr value in SP is: ", rank);
bbb=0;




calculateLFSR (BlockSizeBits, LFSRSP, rank, SP, recordQuota, lfsr32);
adrss= SP[0];
/*printf("FINDME....====================== /** Child Process %d
first lfsr value in SP is: ", rank);
bbb=0;




before_calculating = clock ();
printf
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("C========================== /** Start calculating EP at Child
Process %d for T= %d*/ \n",
rank, T);
///TODO LOOP 3AK
for (i = 0; i < recordQuota; i = i + 1)
{
int GlobalRecord = ((rank - 1) * recordQuota) + i;
if ((i % 100000) == 0)
printf ("C==========================Calculating at core %d
record %d which is %d\n", rank, i, GlobalRecord); //TODO
comeback to this statement oneday. disturbance in the force.
unsigned char *address = SP[i];
unsigned char *addressEP = EP[i];
/*
printf ("\nC...before calc ...... record %d SPp addr %d , value ",i
, address );
int bbbb=0;
for (bbbb=0; bbbb<BlockSizeBytes; bbbb++){ printf("_%c",*
address); address++;}
printf ("...... EPp addr %d , value ", addressEP );










if (debug == 2) {
printf ("\nC Rank %d : after calculating endpoints ........
record %d SPp addr %d , value ", rank, i, address );
int bbbb=0;
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//for (bbbb=0; bbbb<BlockSizeBytes; bbbb++){ printf("___[%c_
%02x]",*address,*address); address++;}
for (bbbb=0; bbbb<BlockSizeBytes; bbbb++){ printf("___[%02x
]",*address); address++;}
printf ("...... EPp addr %d , value ", addressEP );
//for (bbbb=0; bbbb<BlockSizeBytes; bbbb++){ printf("___[%c_
%02x]",*addressEP ,*addressEP); addressEP++;}





/* printf("C========================== Visual confirmation for
calculated SP/EP %d \n", rank);
for (i = offset; i < (offset+recordQuota); i=i+1){
char * SPaddr = SP[i];
char * EPaddr = EP[i];
int blk=0;
for (blk=0; blk<BlockSizeBytes; blk++){ printf("_%c",*SPaddr);
SPaddr++;}




before_sorting = clock ();
if (skipSort == 0)
{
printf
("C========================== /** Start Sorting EPs at Child
Process %d */ \n",
rank);
/*for(i=offset; i<(offset+V); i=i+BlockSizeBytes) {
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printf("Mixxed: [Thread %d ][offset %d][chunksize %d][Record %
d]----[SP:: %c%c ][ EP: %c%c ]\n", rank, offset, V, i, SP[i







int j = 0;
unsigned char *epi;
epi = malloc (BlockSizeBytes + 1); // the extra 1 is for the null
unsigned char *epj;
epj = malloc (BlockSizeBytes + 1); // the extra 1 is for the null
int ret = strcmp (epi, epj);
for (i = 0; i < recordQuota; i = i + 1)
{
if ((i % 10000) == 0)
printf ("C============== sorting at core %d record %d\n",
rank, i);
for (j = i + 1; j < recordQuota; j = j + 1)
{
//epi = malloc(BlockSizeBytes+1); // the extra 1 is for
the null
memcpy (epi, EP[i], BlockSizeBytes);
epi[BlockSizeBytes] = ’\0’;
//char * epj;
//epj = malloc(BlockSizeBytes+1); // the extra 1 is for
the null
memcpy (epj, EP[j], BlockSizeBytes);
epj[BlockSizeBytes] = ’\0’;
int ret = strcmp (epi, epj);
// int ret = strcmp(&EP[i], &EP[j]);
//TODO: when do those string finish? do i need to copy
into another string with \0 at the end?
//what happens if the sort parially works? binary search
wouldnt be good. currently I think the search is
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sequential so it doesn’t matter.




// printf("str1 is less than str2\n");
}
else if (ret > 0)
{
// printf("str2 is less than str1\n");
unsigned char *tmp;
tmp = malloc (BlockSizeBytes);
memcpy (tmp, EP[i], BlockSizeBytes);
memcpy (EP[i], EP[j], BlockSizeBytes);
memcpy (EP[j], tmp, BlockSizeBytes);
memcpy (tmp, SP[i], BlockSizeBytes);
memcpy (SP[i], SP[j], BlockSizeBytes);











/*for(i=offset; i<(offset+V); i=i+BlockSizeBytes) {
printf("Sorted: [Thread %d ][offset %d][chunksize %d][Record %
d]----[SP:: %c%c ][ EP: %c%c ]\n", rank, offset, V, i, SP[i
+0], SP[i+1], EP[i+0], EP[i+1]);
} */
if (debug >= 2) printf
("C========================== /** Visual confirmation for




for (i = 0; i < recordQuota; i=i+1){
char * SPaddr = SP[i];
char * EPaddr = EP[i];
char * CTaddr = CTchallenge;
int blk=0;
printf ("\n>>>>111_____");
for (blk=0; blk<BlockSizeBytes; blk++){ printf("_%c",*SPaddr);
SPaddr++;}
printf ("________222________");
for (blk=0; blk<BlockSizeBytes; blk++){ printf("_%c",*EPaddr);
EPaddr++;}
printf ("_________333______");

















before_searching = clock ();
winner =
searchEPforCT (SP[0], EP[0], rank, offset, V, ReducedCTC,
CTchallenge,
T, BlockSizeBytes, ChallengeKey, CTchallenge);
before_reporting = clock ();
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child_time_to_search =
((float) (before_reporting - just_started)) / CLOCKS_PER_SEC;
printf
("\n\tChildTime %d to finish searching \t : %d just started %d and
before reporting time is %d \n\n\n ",
rank, master_time_to_seed, just_started, before_reporting);
int sss=0;
for (sss=0; sss<numbreOfChallenges; sss++){
printf("SEARCH_ARRAY :: BEGIN ::i rank %d :: count:: %d <==> %c
<==> %c \n",rank, sss,CTArray[sss], KYArray[sss]);
int winner =
searchEPforCT (SP[0], EP[0], rank, offset, V, (unsigned
char *)CTArray[sss], (unsigned char *)CTArray[sss],
T, BlockSizeBytes,(unsigned char *) KYArray[sss], (
unsigned char *)CTArray[sss]);
printf("SEARCH_ARRAY :: END ::i rank %d :: count:: %d <==> %c <==>




for loop all 100 challenges and call search for each
TODO
* */
if (winner > -1)
{
////printf("\nC===>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Winner of





of %d is ... %d\n", rank, winner );
}




//MPI_Abort( MPI_COMM_WORLD , 0);
MPI_Finalize ();
return 0;
//printf( "C==== I %d sent to Boss \n", rank);
/* printf("\n
============================================================
Child Process %d DONE and reported winner%d \n", rank, winner);
*/
}
// DONE TODO cleanup the false alarm.. dealr with 0 return
// DONE TODO add other ciphers
// DONE TODO add multiple LFSR’s for multiple block sizes
// DONE TODO allign, indent better
// TODO, use estimation code from tmt17 to use more CPU and memory
// TODO redo DES, get its lfsr fixed
MPI_Finalize ();
printf (" ...t.........X...........AFTER MPI finalize \n");
return 0;
just_finished = clock ();
}
scinet03-ib0-$
C.2 The Simeck program after doing some changes to






#define LROT24(x, r) ((((x) << (r)) % (1 << 24)) | ((x) >> (24 - (r))))
#define ROUND48(key, lft, rgt, tmp) do { \
tmp = (lft); \
lft = ((lft) & LROT24((lft), 5)) ^ LROT24((lft), 1) ^ (rgt) ^ (key); \
rgt = (tmp); \
} while (0)
#define REV_ROUND48(key, lft, rgt, tmp) do { \
tmp = (rgt); \
rgt = ((rgt) & LROT24((rgt), 5)) ^ LROT24((rgt), 1) ^ (lft) ^ (key); \
lft = (tmp); \
} while (0)
void simeck_48_96( const uint32_t master_key[], const uint32_t
plaintext[], uint32_t ciphertext[] ) {
const int NUM_ROUNDS = 36;
int idx;





uint32_t constant = 0xFFFFFC;
uint32_t sequence = 0x9A42BB1F;























void simeck_48_96_Dec( const uint32_t master_key[], const
uint32_t plaintext[], uint32_t ciphertext[] ) {
const int NUM_ROUNDS = 36;
int idx;





uint32_t constant = 0xFFFFFC;
uint32_t sequence = 0x9A42BB1F;
uint32_t KeySchedule[NUM_ROUNDS];
for (idx = 0; idx < NUM_ROUNDS; idx++) {
KeySchedule[35 - idx]= keys[0],
constant &= 0xFFFFFC;














for (idx = 0; idx < NUM_ROUNDS; idx++) {
REV_ROUND48(
KeySchedule[idx],
ciphertext[1],
ciphertext[0],
temp
);
}
}
#endif // SIMECK48_H
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